Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq, Fishing and Fire Dispute.
Iraq
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) distributed copies of a document outlining a list of ten key questions from Hans Blix’s report to the UN Security Council yesterday which Iraq had to answer.
The PMOS briefed journalists on phonecalls the Prime Minister had made to world leaders during the course of today. This morning, he had had a fifteen-minute conversation with John Howard, the Australian Prime Minister. At lunchtime, he had spoken to Prime Minister Gul of Turkey, as well as Prime Minister Simitis of Greece since he currently held the EU Presidency. These calls had provided an opportunity to take stock of the situation following Dr Blix’s report to the UN yesterday and ahead of the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Bush on Friday. In his phonecall with Prime Minister Gul, the Prime Minister had welcomed the recent conference in Istanbul which had sent a strong message to the Iraqi leadership about the need for full and active co-operation. In his conversation with Prime Minister Simitis, he had welcomed the conclusions of yesterday’s meeting of EU Foreign Ministers in Brussels which had stated that, "The Resolution gave an unambiguous message that the Iraqi Government has a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. The Iraqi authorities must, as an imperative, provide the inspectors, without delay, with all additional and complete information on questions raised by the international community". All three Prime Ministers had agreed that the onus remained on Saddam to comply with his UN obligations. The PMOS added that the Prime Minister was also planning to speak to President Chirac this evening. Tomorrow evening, he would be seeing Prime Minister Berlusconi of Italy. On Thursday, he would be stopping off in Spain to meet Prime Minister Aznar on his way to the US to meet President Bush. Asked whether the Prime Minister had any plans to speak to Chancellor Schroeder, the PMOS said that there were no plans at this stage. He pointed out that the Prime Minister had met the Chancellor in Berlin a fortnight ago. Asked if the Prime Minister continued to regard Spain and Italy as our allies, the PMOS said that it was not for him to speak for the policy of other countries.
Asked if the Prime Minister had been charged with gauging the international reaction to Hans Blix’s assessment yesterday and reporting back to President Bush, the PMOS said that it was important for the Prime Minister to hear the different views from European leaders for himself. The fact that he would be meeting President Bush at the end of this week was also useful. Following yesterday’s significant report, we were seeing an intensification of diplomatic activity. The Prime Minister’s conversations and face-to-face meetings throughout this week were part of that process.
Questioned further about the purpose of the Prime Minister’s telephone conversations today, the PMOS said that the Security Council was due to discuss the Blix report tomorrow. Obviously there were important issues which had to be addressed in terms of how we moved forward from here. The Security Council had indicated that there would be a further report on 14 February. In the meantime, world leaders would continue to talk about yesterday’s report. Asked whether the discussions might focus on timescales, the PMOS said that it was not for him to pre-judge what might be discussed. However, it was clear that timescales were an important factor.
Asked to explain the point of declaring today that Iraq was in material breach before UNMOVIC had presented its final conclusions, the PMOS said that it was important to underline the troubling and disturbing nature of the report and the seriousness with which it was viewed by the UK Government. The issue of co-operation was at the very core of Resolution 1441, as Paragraph 4 stated explicitly. In his report Dr Blix had highlighted a significant number of areas where he did not believe that Saddam had co-operated. It was precisely that which had led us to reach our judgement. Put to him that, under the terms of 1441, a material breach was a trigger for war and whether we were signalling that military action would be forthcoming, the PMOS made clear that Saddam was being provided with a final opportunity to avoid being disarmed by force, although time was running out and the patience of the international community was not infinite. We had been waiting twelve years for him to fulfil his obligations. Members of the international community were continuing to express concern about this very serious situation, which was why we were calling on Saddam to disarm. That could happen in one of three ways: either he could show to the inspectors’ satisfaction that he had disarmed, or do so peacefully as part of an UNMOVIC process. Failing that, he would be disarmed by force. Either way, it would happen. How it might was still Saddam’s choice - but it was not going to be his choice forever.
Questioned as to whether we were still determined to give the weapons inspectors the time they needed to do their job properly, the PMOS said that we obviously wanted the inspections process to work. However, it was clear that that could only happen if Saddam co-operated. UNMOVIC was not a detective agency. It was not the inspectors’ job to go around a country the size of France trying to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The onus was on Saddam to answer their questions to their satisfaction. We were making clear to Saddam that time was running out for the Iraqi regime. Equally, we were indicating that there was still an opportunity for him to comply. Put to him that Jack Straw had said this morning that time had already run out for Saddam, the PMOS said that there would be a further progress report to the Security Council on 14 February. Mr Straw had been making the point that no one should under-estimate the gravity of the current situation. Put to him repeatedly that Mr Straw had stated specifically this morning that the time was up for Saddam, the PMOS said he hadn’t heard that, but the thrust of what Mr Straw had been saying was absolutely clear. Time was running out, but there was still an opportunity for Saddam to comply with his obligations. It was important for Iraq to recognise the seriousness of the situation and that the window of opportunity was narrowing.
Asked the point of another report to the UN when our declaration that Saddam was in material breach would appear to indicate that we were preparing to act unilaterally with the US and mount a military campaign against Iraq, the PMOS said that it remained our desire and preference to have a second UN Resolution. We were not yet at the point of decision, although it was clear from what people were saying that the process could not go on indefinitely. Asked if we were still committed to going down that route given we seemed to have already made up our mind that Saddam was in material breach, the PMOS said that Saddam was in material breach inasmuch as he had not co-operated with the weapons inspectors, as set out in Resolution 1441. He was also in material breach of existing obligations under previous Resolutions. However, as had been made clear, there would be a further report to the Security Council by UNMOVIC and the IAEA during the course of February. No one was talking about ultimatums or deadlines at this stage. However, we were underlining the fact that our patience - and the patience of the international community - was not endless. Questioned as to whether the process of obtaining a second Resolution would have to wait until the next report to the UN on 14 February, the PMOS said that the Security Council was due to discuss the Blix report tomorrow. The Prime Minister would be meeting President Bush on Friday. A further report would be presented to the UN on the 14th. We were no further forward than that. People would just have to be a little patient.
Asked for a reaction to suggestions by some experts that Dr Blix’s findings were not particularly serious or alarming, the PMOS said that he would fundamentally disagree in the first instance. It was important to view UNMOVIC’s conclusions in the context of UNSCOM’s report to the Security Council in 1999 after being forced to leave Iraq. This had never been about the US and UK underlining its own concerns about WMD. It was about actual concerns raised by UNMOVIC, an organisation set up by the UN, who had been unable to satisfy itself regarding outstanding questions left over from the days of its predecessor, UNSCOM. The Blix report was a detailed piece of work, referring to serious issues such as VX nerve gas and anthrax. No doubt there would be some people who would wish to dispute the findings. However, Hans Blix was a serious figure and we continued to have full confidence in his ability to do the job he had been mandated to do. If he was expressing concerns about materials as dangerous as anthrax, mustard gas and VX nerve gas, clearly they should be taken seriously. They should not be dismissed or brushed under the carpet. They were obviously very real concerns about some of the most dangerous weapons known to man.
Asked if the Prime Minister or Ministers were intending to mount an information campaign to persuade the public that Saddam must be dealt with, the PMOS said that we were continuing to go out and ague the case, as Geoff Hoon had done yesterday, for example. Pressed as to whether the Government would share more information with the public, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had indicated that he would seek to share whatever materials he could with the British people if he was able to do so. In talking about public opinion, however, it was important to recognise that we were not at the point of military conflict. If people looked at the Blix report objectively, there was no doubt they would share the concerns being expressed by the weapons inspectors about material they could not account for and questions that had not been answered. That was where we were at the current time.
Fishing
In answer to questions, the PMOS said that Elliot Morley had highlighted some new funding this morning. This afternoon’s meeting was an opportunity for the Prime Minister to hear the views of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation and the National Federation of Fishermen’s Organisations on the impact on the industry following the restrictions agreed in December. The Prime Minister believed that there were difficult decisions we had to address given dwindling fish stocks. We were trying to manage a difficult situation as best we could.
Fire Dispute
Asked whether the new ‘fast-track legislation’ was a joint idea between Downing Street and the Deputy Prime Minister’s Office, the PMOS said that the two had been working very closely on the issue from the outset, and it was obvious that the Prime Minister would have known the details of John Prescott’s announcement in advance.
Asked whether we would still go ahead with the legislation should there be a settlement, the PMOS pointed out that John Prescott had said we were committed to bringing forward this legislation and planned to do so within weeks. He added that we had taken this course of action in order to inject a dose of reality into the dispute. It was clear that the FBU had not been serious about a negotiated settlement. Nor had they been serious about modernisation. We hoped today’s announcement would focus their minds so that they would engage with the employers in a meaningful way.
Asked to clarify where the money was coming from so as to meet the costs of the dispute, the PMOS said that the money was coming from the regeneration budget. The fact that the FBU continued to press for a 40% pay rise with no modernisation was, frankly, unacceptable, particularly in a low inflation environment, where there were 40 applicants for every vacancy.
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