Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Putin Phonecall, Zimbabwe, Asylum and Iraq.
Putin Phonecall
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister had had a twenty-five minute telephone conversation (through an interpreter) with President Putin this morning. They had discussed a range of international issues, as you would expect, and had agreed on the need for Iraq to comply with its UN obligations, including full co-operation with the UN weapons inspectors.
Zimbabwe
Asked to clarify the Government’s position regarding France’s invitation to Robert Mugabe to attend a Franco-African summit in Paris next month, the PMOS said we believed that sanctions - and the need to maintain them - were very important. However, the Foreign Secretary was currently attending the GAC in Brussels which was discussing the issue, and it would not be helpful to pre-empt the outcome of that meeting.
Asylum
Asked what the Prime Minister was intending to do with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had stated in his Frost interview yesterday, it was important to recognise the serious steps we had already taken to legislate on this issue - often against opposition from different sources. Those serious steps included refusing to support asylum applicants who did not apply as soon as possible through the benefits system; making clear that unfounded asylum seekers, particularly from the ten accession countries, returned to their country of origin as soon as possible which, as we had seen last week, had had the impact of reducing applications from the hundreds we had received per week (300 at its peak) - especially from Czech applicants - to one or two per day; more contact management, such as the application registration card, now issued to 85,000 asylum seekers; powers for Immigration Officers to enter work places and toughen up on illegal working; new powers for all asylum seekers to be held in accommodation centres while their claims were processed; clearer rules for removing British citizenship from April 2003; powers to deport asylum seekers who committed serious crimes. These were all measures which we had taken recently to tackle the problem, and some were still coming into effect. As the Prime Minister had said yesterday, we had to wait and see whether they would take effect and result in the objectives we wanted to achieve. However, if they did, we would not be afraid to think more radically if necessary. In the meantime, we would not pre-empt either that thinking-through process, nor pre-judge the effectiveness of the measures which we believed should help ‘bite’ the problem.
Asked how long it would take to judge whether the measures had been effective, the PMOS said that that would become self-evident over time. The measures had either just come into effect, or they were about to do so. We would know within a reasonable timescale whether they were biting or not. Asked if he was talking weeks, months or years, the PMOS said that it would not be helpful to pre-judge the timeframe. He repeated that it was important to give the measures time to work. Put to him that his reluctance to set out a timescale lent weight to the argument that the Prime Minister’s interview yesterday was ‘merely a cynical exercise’ inasmuch as he had thrown out a headline without having any intention to study the ECHR, the PMOS said that that argument would carry more weight had we not taken the measures we had taken - against opposition. These were serious, targeted measures which were designed to deal with the problem of asylum, and we should therefore give them time to take effect. That said, however, as in any policy-making area we had to begin the process of thinking through what action should be taken if they didn’t work. That was the stage we were at and people should not try to jump ahead of themselves at this stage. Put to him that it was the Prime Minister himself who had raised the issue of the ECHR, the PMOS said that no one was accusing the media of having raised the issue. Nor was anyone walking away from it. The point of raising the prospect of having to think the matter through more fundamentally was a recognition that this was a genuine issue which we had to address. Equally, however, given we had taken a series of strong measures - many of them against opposition - it was clearly important to wait and see whether they would take effect. Put to him that the Prime Minister evidently hadn’t waited for the measures to work and that the fact that he had talked about the ECHR was an indication that he didn’t have much confidence in them, the PMOS said that he would disagree. There was no doubt that we were taking the matter very seriously. As an indication of that, we had signalled that we were prepared to think through such a fundamental issue as the ECHR if necessary. Equally, we recognised that the measures we had already taken need time to bite. The two positions were not incompatible.
Questioned as to whether any preparatory work was currently underway to work out the approach that would be necessary to do something as radical as reviewing the ECHR, the PMOS said that if he was being asked whether the Prime Minister had sent a signal that we should begin thinking about these issues, the answer was yes, of course. That was why, as he had underlined, there was a thinking process to be gone through. However, that had to run alongside an assessment process to see whether the measures we had taken were having the impact which we believed they would have. Asked whether the radical measures could be taken unilaterally, the PMOS repeated that he had no intention of pre-judging the outcome of the thinking process. No one was underestimating how fundamental the changes to the ECHR and the UN Convention on Refugees would be were we to go down that route. Pressed further, the PMOS said that the option would be either to stay within the Conventions or walk away from them. That was precisely the purpose of the thinking-through process.
Put to him that the Opposition had advocated this idea last year but that the Government had dismissed it then as nonsense, the PMOS said that as a Civil Servant, it was not for him to get into an ‘argy bargy’ with the Opposition. The Prime Minister’s proposal, which he had outlined yesterday, was being thought-through, as you would expect.
Asked to explain the problem to which dealing with the ECHR might be a solution, the PMOS said that the Conventions in question were over fifty years old and were designed for an era before mass migration from Eastern Europe and beyond. If the interpretation of those Conventions had a perverse impact on a country, that was clearly a problem. Of course, if there were other ways to deal with it through the measures which we had taken, then so be it. That was precisely why we needed to assess their impact so far and decide whether we would have to think about the issue more fundamentally. Asked in what way the interpretation of the Conventions had produced a perverse impact, the PMOS said that that was exactly the question which any fundamental rethink would have to address. However, we were not at that stage yet. Put to him that the Prime Minister surely had an idea about the problem we were facing to which he believed it was worth searching for a solution through a review of the Conventions, the PMOS said that the issue at stake was how to deal effectively with the problem of asylum. If the measures we had taken so far had an impact, then that would be an answer to the question. If they didn’t, then clearly we would have to think of something more fundamental.
Questioned as to whether Article 3 of the ECHR might be reviewed, the PMOS said he had noticed that much of today’s media coverage had focussed on this point. He would not disagree that Article 3 might be discussed. However, people should understand that it was just one issue amongst many to be reviewed.
Asked why the Home Secretary had ruled out the possibility of a review of the Conventions last Monday, the PMOS said that no one underestimated the need to address the issue of asylum. That was why it was better to wait and see whether the measures we had already taken would prove to be effective, as we believed they would. The Prime Minister had taken the opportunity yesterday to underline once again how seriously he regarded the issue and to indicate his willingness to think more radically if the measures we had already taken did not have the effect we hoped they would have. Asked what had happened between last Monday and yesterday to change the Government’s position on this matter, the PMOS repeated that the Prime Minister had been underlining our determination to address the issue of asylum. We continued to believe that the measures we had already taken would be effective. However, if that didn’t prove to be the case, then clearly we would have to think more radically. Asked if the Prime Minister had told the Home Secretary what he was going to say in his Frost interview, the PMOS said journalists could assume that the usual flow of communications between Government Departments had been in operation.
Asked if the Prime Minister had signalled to Ministers that he was determined to tackle the problem fundamentally if necessary, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister held regular meetings with the Home Secretary and relevant officials to discuss the issue of asylum. There was no doubting his continuing interest in - and commitment to - resolving the problem.
Questioned as to whether we could request assistance from our European partners in order to help us deal with the problem of asylum, such as asking France to change its attitude to asylum seekers from Algeria, the PMOS said that the new French Government’s co-operation on issues such as Sangatte and the operation of joint patrols in France had been very welcome. That co-operation was continuing.
Put to him that the ideas with which the Prime Minister was ‘flirting’ were irrelevant given the problems we were experiencing were the result of poor administration in the immigration system, the PMOS pointed out that many of the changes which had been introduced had been designed to improve the system, as well as providing resources and legal back-up which the system had lacked in the past.
Iraq
In answer to questions, the PMOS took the opportunity to set out the Government’s position as to why we believed today was significant. Today was important because we would learn whether, in Hans Blix’s initial view, Iraq was complying with its duty under Paragraph 9 of Resolution 1441 to "co-operate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with UNMOVIC and the IAEA". The reason why Iraq had to comply was clear. For twelve years, Iraq had strung the international community along. It had defied the will of the international community that it should not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As Paragraph 1 of 1441 stated: "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations, in particular through its failure to co-operate with UN inspectors and the IAEA". That was why Mohammed El-Baradei had said in an interview with the BBC Ten O’clock News on 19 January that, "In a court of law, you are innocent until proven guilt. But in the case of Iraq, Iraq has been considered, until recently, in the new Security Council Resolution to be in material breach. So they are being branded as guilty, and therefore they now have to prove their innocence in fact". Fact, not assertion. That was why non-co-operation had been written into the very fabric of 1441. Paragraph 4 could not be clearer. It stated: "False statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution, and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate fully in the implementation of this Resolution, shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations". So non-co-operation was, and always had been, the core standard by which Iraq would be judged. That was not a "narrow definition" as some reports had claimed over the weekend. It was at the very heart of 1441. Iraq had to tell the inspectors what had happened to the material the UN had known it had had in 1999 when the inspectors had been evicted. That material had included: 350 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent; 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; enough growth media to produce over three times the anthrax spores Iraq had admitted to possessing; 30,000 special munitions delivery of chemical and biological agents. This was material the UN had known in 1999 that Iraq had in its possession. They were not things you lost like your car keys around the house. They were deadly weapons which Saddam has defied the world to develop. It was not unreasonable, therefore, to expect him to tell the inspectors where they were, never mind what he had being doing over the past four years. That was why non-co-operation was designed to be at the very core of Resolution 1441. It had not been an ‘add-on’ or a ‘narrow definition’, but the very core.
Asked the point of the UNSCOM weapons inspectors given they hadn’t been able to destroy the materials they had discovered before leaving Iraq in 1998, the PMOS declined to comment on what had happened four years ago, but pointed out that if all the munitions had been destroyed - as Saddam had said they had been, you would have thought that he would have kept some sort of record so that he could show UNMOVIC.
Questioned as to whether a specific deadline would be announced shortly in order to force Saddam Hussein to comply with Resolution 1441, the PMOS said that it was important to wait for Hans Blix’s report to the Security Council today. The key to all this was Iraqi co-operation. Was Saddam answering the questions being put to him? If not, was a pattern of obstruction emerging? As the past twelve years had shown, Saddam’s strategy was very simple. It was to string along the international community, hope that we lost interest in him and use that time to continue to develop WMD. That was precisely what Resolution 1441 had been designed to counter.
Asked if the Prime Minister had abandoned his ‘wait and see’ policy in which he exhorted people to wait until the weapons inspectors had made an important discovery, the PMOS pointed out that the weapons inspectors had made important discoveries - they had found shell casings and important documents. We also knew that Iraq was not co-operating, as they were required to do under the terms of Resolution 1441, given their refusal to allow their scientists to be interviewed by the inspectors without the presence of Iraqi minders. We also knew that Iraq wanted to make tape recordings of those conversations in order to intimidate the scientists and warn them that if they co-operated they and their families would be punished, or even killed. Asked if this clear lack of full co-operation constituted a further material breach, the PMOS said that an inspections regime had been set up and the inspectors were doing their job. We had full confidence that they were doing it properly. As Mohammed El-Baradei had said last week, time was running out for Iraq. It was a very tense situation. Iraq had to take a proactive approach. It should not appear that they were being dragged into compliance. Rather, they should appear to be eager to comply. Those was the standards set down by the inspectors themselves. Asked how long the Prime Minister believed the inspectors needed to do their job, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had said all that he could say about this matter in his Frost interview yesterday.
Asked why the weapons inspectors still hadn’t found anything significant when Hans Blix and his team had been given intelligence information which should have helped them with their work, the PMOS pointed out that Saddam had had four years to develop a strategy for the dispersal of the WMD he had. In our view, that strategy had been implemented over the last few months. That was why Resolution 1441 had not stated that we needed to find a smoking gun. Rather, we had to show that Saddam was not complying with the demands of the UN by declining to be proactive and help identify and destroy the WMD he had in his possession. Asked if he would accept the FT’s suggestion today that the Prime Minister regreted his earlier emphasis on the need to find a smoking gun, the PMOS said that it went without saying that finding a smoking gun would make life a lot easier for everyone. However, the reality was that Saddam had had four years to hide his WMD. Our allies were fully aware of that fact, which was why they had agreed to the wording of 1441 - which, it should remembered, had been passed unanimously. Asked if the Prime Minister continued to believe that the public would back a war with Iraq despite there being no smoking gun, the PMOS said that the requirement for Saddam to co-operate with the weapons inspectors was written clearly Resolution 1441. He wasn’t suddenly making it up today. It was there in black and white - and had remained there ever since it had been agreed unanimously by the fifteen members of the Security Council.
Asked if there were any plans to publish new intelligence material in a further dossier as suggested in some papers at the weekend, the PMOS said that he didn’t recognise the reports.
Asked if the Prime Minister continued to believe that a second UN Resolution would be desirable, and if so, why, the PMOS said that it was important for the will of the international community - through the UN - to be seen to be upheld. Over the past twelve years, Saddam had defied it repeatedly. Consequently, the international community had to decide whether the UN, collectively, was an effective body which enforced its will, or not.
Asked whether the Prime Minister was planning to speak to President Chirac, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any plans for him to do so at this stage. However, he would not rule out the possibility that the Prime Minister might talk to other leaders during the course of the week.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister ’sympathised’ with the tactics adopted by Chancellor Schroeder over the last few days given Germany’s forthcoming regional elections, the PMOS said that being asked to comment on the domestic politics of another country was quite a novelty for him. However, it wasn’t his job to do so and he had no intention of starting a trend today.
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