Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Elysee Treaty, Iraq and Finsbury Park Mosque.
Elysee Treaty
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister had sent letters to President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder to congratulate them on the 40th anniversary of co-operation between France and Germany, as enshrined in the Elysee Treaty. The anniversary would be marked tomorrow at a Franco-German Summit, which involved the entire German Parliament travelling to Versailles. In his letter to President Chirac, the Prime Minister had written, "Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer had both the vision and the political boldness to see that lasting peace in Europe could only be built on the foundation of reconciliation between France and Germany". In his letter to Chancellor Schroeder, he had written, "The friendship between France and Germany remains a compelling force for progress in the European Union".
Iraq
Asked what made the Prime Minister so confident that a second UN Resolution on Iraq could be obtained when France was expressing alarm about the UK and US stepping up the rhetoric supporting military action, the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had underlined this morning, we did not take any country’s position on this matter for granted. However, it was worth remembering that the UN Security Council had unanimously backed Resolution 1441, empowering the weapons inspectors to carry out their operations in Iraq. If the inspectors reported back to the UN that Saddam was not co-operating or complying as outlined in the Resolution, the Security Council would be faced with a straight-forward, logical choice - either to enforce the will of the UN and the international community, or to allow its will to be defied - as Saddam had been doing for the past twelve years. Given that choice, the Prime Minister was confident that it would be possible to obtain a second Resolution, albeit with the caveat he had set out this morning.
Put to him that the French had made it clear that they would not regard Saddam’s failure to co-operate actively with the inspectors as a ‘casus belli’, the PMOS said that that he had no intention of getting drawn into a discussion about hypothetical situations. Nor would he participate in a ‘remote-controlled’ dialogue with the French. All he would do was refer journalists back to Resolution 1441 which had placed a duty on Saddam to co-operate actively. That had been reiterated by both Hans Blix and Mohammed ElBaradei too. People should resist the temptation to second-guess what might happen on 27 January. Asked if the Prime Minister continued to believe that 27 January was not a deadline, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had reiterated his view this morning.
Asked on what source the Prime Minister had based his confidence this morning that Saddam’s regime was weakening, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had referred to intelligence reports which, due to their nature, he had been unable to elaborate upon further. That said, it was clear that the work of the weapons inspectors last week could only have convinced Saddam that the inspectors were taking their work seriously and using all the resources available to begin unearthing any information and physical evidence relating to his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As the Prime Minister had put it this morning, the days of hide-and-seek were over. Saddam’s games of obstruction and obfuscation which he had, from his point of view, played successfully for the last twelve years, were over. There was evidence that the discoveries in recent days had rattled the regime. Of course, that was not to overstate the situation or suggest that we were about to see a breakthrough in the next few days. However, it was clear that the work of the inspectors was having an impact. Iraq appeared to have received the message that the inspectors were serious and that this was now a different ball game.
Questioned as to whether it remained the job of the weapons inspectors to declare a breach, the PMOS said that under the terms of 1441, it was up to the inspectors to report back to the Security Council. It would then be for the Security Council to discuss the matter. Asked repeatedly if the inspectors had a right to declare that, in their view, there had been a material breach, the PMOS repeated that it was their job to report back to the Security Council. This would be followed by a discussion by the Security Council itself. He was not going to pre-judge what Hans Blix might say in his report on 27 January. That was a matter for him. Asked how the position adopted by the Prime Minister this morning would tally with Dr El-Baradei’s comment that he and his colleague, Hans Blix, would tell the Security Council that they needed more time to do their job, with the French who had said they believed that nothing today would justify military action in Iraq, with Russia who had observed that the search for a political settlement was far from exhausted and with China who had commented that 27 January represented a new beginning, not an end, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had obviously based his evidence on more than reported comments. It was important for people to be patient and wait for 27 January. It was not a deadline and we would take things forward from there. Asked if he would agree that Dr ElBaradei’s comment about needing more time would rule out the possibility of Hans Blix declaring on 27 January that there had been a material breach, the PMOS repeated that he had no intention of pre-judging the outcome of Dr Blix’s report. He pointed out that both Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei had underlined that Saddam Hussein was not co-operating proactively, as he was required to do under the terms of Resolution 1441.
Asked if the Prime Minister was hoping to have public support were military action to be taken against Iraq, the PMOS pointed out that military action remained a hypothetical question. The UK and other countries had committed themselves to going down the UN route which, opinion polls suggested, was what people wanted to see. Since last September, he had been underlining that the UN must be a way to deal with the issue of WMD, not avoid it. He believed that the public would see the logic of adopting such a position. Of course he understood fully people’s reluctance to wage a military campaign against Iraq. It was not something to be condemned. However, if that was the only way to ensure that Saddam did not continue to flout the will of the UN, that he was disarmed and to reduce the threat of WMD, then so be it.
Asked to clarify the Prime Minister’s comment about a link between Al Qaida and the people of Iraq, the PMOS said that it was a fact that there were Al Qaida operatives in Iraq. However, we didn’t know the precise linkage between them and members of the Iraqi Government.
Finsbury Park Mosque
Asked if the Prime Minister felt it had been appropriate to leave Abu Hamza to his own devices over the past few years and whether he felt comfortable about the fact that he had been allowed to stay in the country, the PMOS said that the Home Secretary had made it clear that Abu Hamza was being monitored very closely. It went without saying that any action that was taken must be within the law. Asked if the law needed changing in order to deport him, the PMOS said that it was not our policy to comment on individual cases. As a general point, however, there was a wide range of possible prosecutions which, if appropriate, the authorities could take under the Race Relations Act and Terrorism Act 2000. The new Asylum and Immigration Act had also provided extra powers - some of which were due to come into effect over the next few months.
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