Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq, Cricket/Zimbabwe, Fire Dispute, Missile Defence and UK Human Rights/September 11.
Iraq
Asked to clarify the Chancellor’s remark that Saddam Hussein should be punished, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that the Chancellor had been underlining the point that if Saddam Hussein continued to defy the international community he could not go unpunished. That was a bit different. His comments had not been particularly remarkable or groundbreaking. He had simply been amplifying and endorsing what the Prime Minister had said yesterday.
Asked for a reaction to a report that the weapons inspectors had found a quantity of suspicious materials in Iraq which appeared to have been imported illegally, the PMOS said that we were aware of the report. Although it should come as no surprise to anyone to hear that Saddam was breaking sanctions, it was nevertheless important to wait for Dr Blix’s progress report to the UN Security Council on 27 January. As we had said from the outset, it was essential for the UN route and the new inspection regime to have integrity so that the inspectors could do their work properly. We were serious about going down the UN route. No one had been paying lip service to it. However, we had to be clear that the purpose was to disarm Saddam Hussein of his weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In his interim report to the Security Council last week, Dr Blix had observed that a large number of unanswered questions still remained. It was worth remembering that Resolution 1441 was about active Iraqi co-operation with the weapons inspectors rather than simply allowing them into Iraq. As the head of the IAEA, Mohammed El-Baradei, had said yesterday, it was no use co-operating in process if you failed to engage on substance. Thus, Dr Blix’s comment that there were questions to which the Iraqi regime had a responsibility to provide answers was clearly significant. As our dossier published last year had outlined, UNSCOM’s report to the UN in January 1999 had set out in some detail a number of items which they believed had not been accounted for. We had assessed, for example, based on their reports, that they had been unable to account for 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including one and a half tonnes of VX nerve gas. UNSCOM had also stated that Iraq had not verifiably accounted for a minimum of 2,160 kilos of growth media for biological agents, and had also failed to provide credible evidence that mustard gas-filled artillery shells and biologically-capable aerial bombs had been destroyed. So when Hans Blix and his team were underlining that there were unanswered questions, the Iraqi regime had a responsibility to account for what the UN had set out in previous reports. Moreover, when they stated that Saddam’s declaration was incomplete, that was obviously a cause for concern. Saddam had to understand that co-operation with the weapons inspectors meant more than just opening gates. It meant answering their questions as well. Active, not passive, co-operation.
Asked if he would agree with some in the US who believed that Saddam should be seen as guilty until proven innocent, the PMOS said that people should not forget that a UN process was ongoing. Hans Blix was a serious figure and he was doing a serious job. He now had a full complement of weapons inspectors and was determined to move the process forward. Given the outstanding questions, however, it was clear that the Iraqi regime had a responsibility not only to allow the weapons inspectors into the country, but to answer the perfectly legitimate questions which the international community was asking about a WMD capability that had been identified by UNSCOM under previous inspection regimes. The UN process had to go at its own pace. There was no point jumping to the next chapter before seeing how this one concluded. That said, the final outcome was already clear - Saddam Hussein would be disarmed. How that might happen was a decision for him.
In answer to further questions, the PMOS said it was worth remembering that, despite the obstruction and deceit which UNSCOM had had to deal with in Iraq before leaving, they had still managed to destroy large quantities of chemical and biological agents. However, as Hans Blix had said, there were still a large number of unanswered questions - not least in relation to what UNSCOM had reported was still left there. In our view, it was important to listen to what he had to say.
Asked if the Government had a view on the legality of the US Administration’s decision to remove 8,000 of 11,000 pages from the Iraqi dossier before making it available to the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, the PMOS said that what was important was for the declaration to be tested by Hans Blix and his team now that the weapons inspectors were up to full strength. They had access to the full declaration and were the ones whom the UN had tasked to do the job.
Asked to detail the precise nature of Hans Blix’s work, the PMOS said that where Dr Blix went and who he spoke to was a matter for him. He had expressed concern and disappointment about unanswered questions and issues which had not been addressed in Saddam’s declaration. That was where the focus should lie.
Cricket/Zimbabwe
Asked if the Government had told the ECB in the Summer that we did not believe the England cricket team should go to Zimbabwe, the PMOS said that we had been through the history of our contacts with the ECB several times. The first meeting between Government officials and the ECB had taken place on 5 July 2002. As had been made clear when the FCO had made details of the meeting public on 9 January 2003, the officials had not yet consulted ministers. Nevertheless, they had said that the Government might find it difficult to accept a decision in favour of the England team playing in Zimbabwe in the light of the Zimbabwean Government’s record on human rights. Mike O’Brien had been the first Minister to make a public statement on this issue in December 2002 and he had been followed by Jack Straw and Clare Short soon afterwards. This was a difficult situation for the Government because while we were able to express a view, we were unable to instruct. Equally, it was difficult for the ECB for the reasons they had given. We had set out our opinion that it would be preferable for the England team not to go to Zimbabwe. They had taken a different view and we had to accept it given we had maintained throughout that it was their decision. We would continue to speak with the ECB regarding their determination not to allow Mr Mugabe to make propaganda out of it. We would also remain in contact with them about the deteriorating humanitarian situation which might have a knock-on effect on security and safety issues.
Asked whether the individual members of the England team should take a different decision to that made by the ECB and not go, the PMOS said that he was not a spokesman for the England cricket team. As he understood it, Tim Lamb had answered the question at the ECB’s press conference this afternoon.
Fire Dispute
Asked for an update on preparations for the next round of fire strikes, the PMOS said that the employers and the FBU were taking part in talks at Acas today - as was right and proper since the only way this matter would be resolved was through negotiation rather than unjustified industrial action. In the meantime, the Government was continuing to make prudent contingency arrangements, as you would expect. Asked if the British military would be able cope with another fire strike given the build up of forces in the Gulf, the PMOS referred journalists to the Chief-of-Defence Staff’s press briefing towards the end of last year in which he had said that the military would be able to meet its different commitments irrespective of any industrial action. That said, it was obvious that if any changes would have to be made, they would of course be made.
Asked if the Deputy Prime Minister had been involved in today’s discussions between the employers and the FBU, the PMOS said no. He pointed out that, after the last set of talks had broken down and then started up again, the Deputy Prime Minister had sent a letter to Sir Jeremy Beecham of the LGA setting out the parameters relating to Government funding of any future deal. As he had made clear, anything over 4% would have to be paid for through modernisation. That remained the position. We welcomed the fact that discussions were continuing at Acas this week. However, just because there had been a change of venue did not meant the rules of the game had changed. They hadn’t.
Missile Defence
Asked if there would be an update on Fylingdales in the short term, the PMOS said that the Government had received a request from the US Administration to use the site. We had said that we would make a final decision early in the New Year following discussion in Parliament. That remained the case. We would set out our view shortly. Asked how, the PMOS said that it was likely to take the form of a statement from the Defence Secretary, followed by a discussion in Parliament. Asked whether that might happen this week, the PMOS said that journalists would have to be patient and wait and see.
UK Human Rights/September 11
Asked if Downing Street was concerned about the European Parliament’s criticism of the UK’s record on human rights post-September 11 with regard to terrorists and asylum seekers, in addition to their accusation that Downing Street had been involved in excessive media manipulation in the days following the September 11 attacks in New York, the PMOS said that he hadn’t seen any reports on this issue and therefore could not comment in detail. However, he would point out that the human rights of the people in Afghanistan had improved considerably as a result of the removal of an oppressive, violent regime which had thought nothing of executing women in football stadiums, for example. Moreover, all Governments had had to take difficult decisions post-September 11 as a result of an increased threat to security.
delicious
digg
facebook
