Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq and War on Terror.
Iraq
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) drew journalists’ attention to Jack Straw’s speech today to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in which he had talked about the French and German so-called ‘plan’ - which, he pointed out, both Administrations continued to disown as a ‘plan’. Mr Straw had made the point that the people putting forward these proposals were now making the case that Saddam had failed to meet what was required of him under Resolution 1441. He had also warned of the dangers of attempting to rewrite 1441. For example, if blue-helmeted troops were to be used, such a move would need a permissive environment which would "require the Iraqi army to stay in its barracks and again to concede a degree of active co-operation infinitely greater than any shown so far". Jack Straw was saying that these proposals were a recipe for delay and indecision. Dealing with Iraq would become harder, not easier, if we were to rewrite 1441 and the final opportunity it had spelt out for Saddam.
Questioned as to why the UK and US seemed to be so ‘hell bent’ on war with Iraq that they were refusing to seek any other solution to the problem, the PMOS said that to suggest such a thing was a total distortion of our position. Asked why we had brushed aside France and Germany’s ‘plan’ when it presented a possible diplomatic solution, the PMOS said that people had predicted last summer that no one would go down the UN route. Well, we had. There was a UN process and a UN Resolution which placed obligations on Saddam Hussein to co-operate. It went without saying that we would like to resolve this matter peacefully. All that needed to happen was for Saddam to engage with the weapons inspectors and co-operate fully by disarming. In our view, this could probably be done with significant fewer inspectors than there were currently in Iraq if his attitude changed and if he had the will to do it. Challenged that the UK and US were not looking for anything other than a military solution, the PMOS said that we were looking for Saddam Hussein to fulfil his international obligations and to disarm or be disarmed. No one would be more pleased than ourselves were that to happen peacefully. Ultimately, however, that choice was not ours. It was Saddam’s. Questioned further, the PMOS said that Resolution 1441 was the route map to which the international community had signed up. It had not talked about partial compliance, partial co-operation or inspectors going in with a UN protectorate. It had put very clear demands on Saddam to co-operate for the reasons that were very well known. He had been playing games with the UN for twelve years. People were coming at this from the wrong perspective. No one would like this problem to be resolved peacefully more than the British Government. Equally, we could not allow a tyrant to flout the will of the international community and to develop WMD which could have potentially devastating consequences.
Asked why Jack Straw was going to such lengths to rebut the Franco-German ‘plan’ even though, as they themselves had admitted, it wasn’t a ‘plan’ anyway, the PMOS said that given it was being written as fact even though it had been denied, it was clear that it was sometimes necessary to address some of the ‘media realities’ rather than actual ones.
Asked if he had any detail about conversations the Prime Minister might have had with world leaders today, the PMOS said no. Today was perhaps more a case of the disputes being public and the diplomacy being private.
War on Terror
Asked if the UK would follow the example of the US Homeland Security Adviser, Tom Ridge, and advise British citizens to stock up with three days’ worth of food, water and medicines and put sticky tape over the windows to prevent a biological attack, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any plans to do so. Asked why the US was taking such precautions, the PMOS said that it was for different administrations to respond to particular circumstances as they saw fit. Asked why there was no similar sense of urgency in this country to take the same course of action, the PMOS said that we had announced a heightened security presence in parts of the South East of the country for the reasons which had been set out by the Met Police last night. As the Prime Minister had said in his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet last November, the Government had to make fine judgements. We had to take whatever security measures we could consistent with the desire for people to lead normal lives. Given the terrorist threat was real, people had to get used to the idea that the response to it would rise and fall accordingly. This was not an exact science. There was no rule book to deal with such things. The guiding principles were to protect the security of the people of this country consistent with the desire to ensure as best we could that we did not do the terrorists’ job for them. That was exactly what we were doing.
Asked what action the British Government was taking to prepare people for a potential biological or chemical attack, the PMOS pointed out that we had ordered stocks of the smallpox vaccination, for example, in keeping with the advice from the World Health Organisation. Contingency planning was kept under constant review, as you would expect. We had also said that should we feel it appropriate to issue specific warnings to the public to take a particular course of action for their own safety, then of course we would do so, just as we would close down any part of our infrastructure if it was considered necessary. Clearly there were difficult judgements to be made. The threat of international terrorism was serious and real. We could not - and did not - ignore it. Equally, however, he repeated that we had to be mindful of the desire not to do the terrorists’ job for them.
Asked if we were worried that making a similar announcement to the one made by Tom Ridge in the US could spread panic in the UK, the PMOS said that if the Government felt it appropriate to take a particular course of action, then it would do so without hesitation. That went without saying.
Asked to confirm reports of a specific threat of a rocket attack on Heathrow, the PMOS said that he had seen the reports but had no comment to make about them. As he had said this morning, there were good operational and security reasons why we were not commenting in detail on the measures we were taking. Our security response would vary according to circumstances. Equally it might be the case that what we said would vary according to circumstances. Put to him that tonight’s news bulletins and tomorrow’s papers were going to carry reports of potential rocket attacks on Heathrow and that it would seem odd to the British public that the Government was refusing to comment on it, the PMOS pointed out that the Government had commented given he had been answering questions about this matter in the way he had. The Met police had also issued a statement. As journalists we were well aware, it had never been our policy to comment on reports relating to the nature of any specific intelligence or otherwise. Put to him that people were entitled to know what the military operation around Heathrow was all about, the PMOS said that there was an ongoing operation. In relation to specific threats, he had said all he was going to say.
Put to him that the Prime Minister had given a commitment to warn people of specific threats, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had stated that we would advise people as and when we felt it appropriate to do so and equally give them information such as we had today. We had made clear that if we believed there was a necessity to give specific advice or warning to the public, we would do so. This was obviously a difficult area where fine judgements had to made for reasons which were well known - and which we believed people understood. Asked if he was implying that whatever intelligence we had received about Heathrow it hadn’t been specific or ‘alarming’ enough to close it down and whether the threat was related to the end of the Hajj, the PMOS said that the Met Police statement had made it clear that the measures that had been taken were precautionary and were related both to action being taken by other countries and the possibility that Al Qaida might use the end of the Eid festival to mount attacks. Heathrow remained open and was continuing to operate as normal, although obviously with heightened security. It had been considered important to make a statement about the airport so that people understood why there was a heightened security presence. Asked if was necessary to deploy tanks at the Departure Gate, the PMOS said that operational decisions and troop deployments were a matter for the Met given the military came under their command in this instance.
Asked for a reaction to the suggestion that the measures which had been taken were part of a propaganda effort by the Government to ratchet up support for a possible military campaign in Iraq, the PMOS said that these issues were too serious to mess around with in the way being proposed. He hadn’t heard that suggested seriously.
Pressed again as to whether the action that had been taken at Heathrow related to a specific threat and whether things would become clearer by the end of the day given the Government’s commitment to explain to people what it was doing in their name, the PMOS said that he fully understood the point being made. Equally, however, people understood that the objectives of the terrorists could be achieved quickly by effectively closing down the country. These were difficult matters which had to be handled sensitively. He added that he was unable to comment any further on the intelligence picture for obvious reasons. However, it was evident that this action would not have been taken unless it had been thought appropriate and necessary. He acknowledged that he was being asked perfectly valid questions, but he was unable to say a huge amount more given the constraints he was under.
Asked who had decided to deploy troops around Heathrow, the PMOS said that there was obviously an ongoing discussion between the security services and the police. In addition, it was unlikely that such action would have been taken without the involvement of Ministers or the Prime Minister.
Questioned repeatedly as to whether the threat was serious or if it was a propaganda campaign by the Government to raise the level of support for war on Iraq, the PMOS reiterated the fact that the measures which had been put in place would not have been put in place had it not been felt appropriate. These issues were too serious to make play of in the way that some people appeared to be suggesting, although he acknowledged that he hadn’t heard any such suggestions himself. As the Met had stated, there was a heightened security situation and they had believed it to be prudent to raise security at the current time for the reasons they had given. It was important for people to be sensitive to the fact that there was an ongoing police operation and that there were operational and security reasons as to why we were unable to say a huge amount about it.
Asked when the Prime Minister had spoken to the Met Police Commissioner and what they had discussed, the PMOS said that he was not going to get drawn into a processological discussion. However, journalists could take it as read that the Prime Minister had been party to the decision to station troops at Heathrow. Asked if he was implying that the Prime Minister had authorised the action, the PMOS said journalists could assume that was the case. Asked if he would have given the go ahead after a conversation with the Met Police Commissioner, the PMOS said that it would have come about following contact with the relevant people.
Asked if the Government believed that there was more likely to be an attack on the UK if/when military action was launched against Iraq, the PMOS observed that terrorists did not discriminate in the way being suggested. Besides, we were not in a conflict situation in Iraq, so journalists should try not to get too ahead of themselves. Post-September 11, people had to accept that the threat was present everywhere. For example, surely no one had thought that it would manifest itself in Bali, yet it had in a devastating way. It was not in the British tradition to be backward in dealing with these problems. There were twin threats - WMD and international terrorism - and we had to deal with them both. The idea that we might make ourselves any less of a target by adopting a particular position did not hold up to scrutiny given the large number of arrests of suspected terrorists across Europe in recent weeks in countries such as France where they were taking a different position.
In answer to lengthy questioning about whether he had said there was ‘an ongoing investigation in relation to a specific threat’, the PMOS said he had given the answers he had given. Asked whether he denied there was a specific threat, the PMOS said that he had answered as he had.
delicious
digg
facebook
