Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Two-Tier Work Force, Iraq and War on Terror.
Two-Tier Work Force
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) highlighted today’s announcement on the ‘two-tier workforce’. He reminded journalists that the Prime Minister had made clear in October 2002 his intention to end what some were calling the ‘two-tier workforce’. He had said at the time, "I say if the trade unions work with us in the best way of delivering the service, we will work with you on ending the two-tier workforce. Since then, there had been detailed discussions between the Government, trade unions and service contractors to meet the concerns of the unions and the equally valid concerns of the service contractors for greater clarity over the proposed code of practice. It was the Government’s belief that what we were announcing today was a major step to ensure decent pay and conditions for key public service workers. There would be a new code of practice covering the employment of key staff in the main areas of contracted out public services. It would offer, for the first time, new protection for low-paid but important public service workers. The Prime Minister had been personally involved in seeking to draw this issue to a conclusion.
Asked for a reaction to the CBI’s comment that the agreement was a result of the Government’s desire to keep the trade unions on board ahead of a ‘particularly tricky’ Labour Party Spring conference this weekend, the PMOS said that he would disagree. This had been an ongoing issue for many months and had been a genuine cause for concern. He remarked that we had talked about little else immediately after the last election. We wanted to see greater diversity in the provision of public services and were therefore putting in significant extra funding to run alongside the reforms we were putting in place. We had always maintained, however, that the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of public services should not be at the expense of lower terms and conditions for key public sector workers. The CBI would continue to be involved in the implementation of the measures given they had been involved from the outset in trying to reach agreement on these issues. However, it was a fact that discussions had stalled and the Prime Minister had been determined to try to find a way through the logjam.
Iraq
Questioned about a letter the Prime Minister had written to the EU Presidency about Iraq, the PMOS said that a Special EU Council had been arranged for Monday which the Prime Minister would be attending. No one should be surprised that he had written to the Presidency given the Presidency had asked for written contributions from EU members states when the Summit had first been announced. The letter had been addressed to Prime Minister Simitis of Greece and had been copied to the other fourteen member states, as well as the ten accession partners and three candidate countries since they were also due to attend Monday’s meeting. The letter set out the Government’s policy in seeking full implementation of Resolution 1441. The PMOS added that, as part of the preparation for the Summit and the continuation conversation with international leaders, the Prime Minister had spoken last night to Prime Minister Berlusconi and had spoken today to Chancellor Schroeder. He had also spoken to Prime Minister Simitis himself, who had welcomed his letter.
Asked repeatedly why the letter hadn’t been published, the PMOS said that it was a private communication which had been sent to the Presidency. Asked why Reuters had received a copy, the PMOS said that it hadn’t come from us. Asked if Reuters had been right to suggest that the Prime Minister expected EU members to ‘do their duty’ in implementing Resolution 1441, the PMOS said that the General Affairs Council had issued a clear statement two weeks ago setting out the necessity for Saddam to co-operate and making clear that this was the final opportunity for him to do so. The points the Prime Minister was making to his EU partners should not come as any surprise given our view was well known. Asked if he would agree that it was ridiculous that twenty five countries had received the Prime Minister’s letter - some of whom had chosen to publish it - and yet it wasn’t being released in the UK, the PMOS said that the letter had been sent by the Prime Minister to the EU Presidency and copied to member states, accession partners and candidate countries. It had been sent at a sensitive time while we were in the midst of dealing with serious issues. The Prime Minister had decided that it was better for the letter to remain private. That was that. If it leaked there wasn’t much we could do about it.
Put to him that the Prime Minister was effectively pre-judging Hans Blix’s report to the UN tomorrow through his letter, the PMOS repeated that the Greek Presidency had invited contributions from European leaders. No doubt other heads of government would also have taken the opportunity to write to the Presidency and have their views disseminated in a similar manner. He reiterated that the views of the British Government on the issue of Iraq were very clear.
Asked for further detail about the Prime Minister’s phonecall with Chancellor Schroeder earlier today, the PMOS said that it had been a perfectly good conversation. There was clearly a shared objective but a difference in view in terms of how we might fulfil it.
Asked to explain how the long range al-Samoud 2 missile which Iraq was reportedly developing could cause Saddam to be in material breach when the missile had been declared in Iraq’s dossier, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had been at pains to make clear this morning that these were judgements for the experts to make. Hans Blix would be reporting to the Security Council tomorrow. As he understood it, the story was based on reports of missiles which exceeded the 93 mile range set out under UN Resolutions. If that was the case, it would be serious. Questioned further, the PMOS said that we had seen the reports and the Prime Minister had commented on them. However, it was important to wait for Dr Blix’s presentation tomorrow. Asked if the discovery was a ‘trigger’, the PMOS emphasised that people should be patient and wait for Dr Blix’s report. There were Resolutions which set out the range of missile which Iraq was permitted in the view of the international community. We had seen the reports indicating that they might have been exceeded. As the Prime Minister had said this morning, were that to be the case then Iraq would be in further material breach. Put to him that we had known about these missiles all along and that there was nothing new in the reports, the PMOS repeated that journalists should wait for Dr Blix’s presentation tomorrow. The Prime Minister had commented on the reports because he had been asked about them. It was also important to remember that there were still outstanding questions remaining which Saddam had yet to answer - such as the 6,500 missiles which were unaccounted for when UNSCOM left Iraq in 1998 and the missing VX nerve agent, as well as the whole issue of active co-operation. Put to him that the Prime Minister had been attempting to condition the process by suggesting that the find showed the futility of expanding the inspection regime, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister’s position on this was clear. It was not a question of bringing in additional inspectors. If the Iraqis co-operated fully with us, the job could probably be done with far fewer numbers than the current contingent. It was a question of attitude. Asked which rule the Iraqis had broken given they had declared the al-Samoud 2 missile, the PMOS said everyone accepted that Saddam’s declaration was incomplete because it had not addressed concerns raised by UNSCOM to the Security Council in 1999. Hans Blix himself had made this point. Questioned as to whether any of the missiles might have been upgrades of previous models, the PMOS said that he didn’t know as he wasn’t a weapons inspector.
War on Terror
Asked whether the Prime Minister had been informed about the security alert at Gatwick this afternoon, the PMOS said that as he understood it, it related to an arrest made at the airport. He referred journalists to Sussex police for further detail. Questioned as to why tanks hadn’t been sent to Gatwick, the PMOS said that operational decisions were taken on the advice of the security services to deal with the terrorist threat as appropriate. Asked why Heathrow was more of target, the PMOS said that as had been made clear by Sir John Stevens, there was a heightened threat. The security response had been consistent with what the experts were telling us. People had to get used to the idea that as the threat level rose and fell at different times and in different circumstances, so the security would rise and fall in parallel. These were decisions and judgements which had to be reached on the basis of security advice. Questioned further, the PMOS said that the decision which had been taken to deploy the military at Heathrow was a conscious decision for the reasons which had been set out.
Asked to comment on the suggestion that the Prime Minister should appoint a special Minister for Homeland Security, the PMOS said that the Home Secretary had responsibility for this area and kept in regular contact with the Prime Minister. The Cabinet Office also had responsibility for security in the shape of Sir David Omand who had been specifically tasked in this area and reported directly to the Prime Minister as well as the Home Secretary. Asked if he would agree that a Minister for Homeland Security was something which should seriously be considered given the heightened terrorist threat, the PMOS observed that it was odd on the one hand for the Government to be accused of inertia, while on the other to be accused of over-reacting by deploying military forces. We would take whatever measures were considered necessary to deal with the terrorist threat.
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