Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: 2012 Olympic Games, Iraq and Hartlepool Mail.
2012 Olympic Games
The PMOS took the opportunity to inform journalists that the issue of a possible London bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games was expected to be discussed at Cabinet in a few weeks’ time. While a significant amount of preparatory work had already been done, it was clear that more time was needed before reaching a decision on the issue.
Iraq
The PMOS updated journalists on telephone conversations involving the Prime Minister over the weekend. On Saturday evening, he had participated in a four-way phonecall with President Bush and Prime Ministers Aznar and Berlusconi. Yesterday morning, he had spoken to President Putin, followed by a conversation in the afternoon with President Fox of Mexico and President Lagos of Chile. He had also spoken again to Prime Minister Aznar of Spain.
The PMOS said that the next step in the UN process was the tabling of a draft UN Security Council Resolution. We would not know precisely when that might happen until after a closed session meeting of UN Ambassadors later today. Asked if Downing Street was aware of reports that France was ready to table its own motion to the UN, the PMOS said that we were aware of the speculation and would wait and see what happened.
In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that it was important for people to maintain a sense of perspective on this whole issue and pointed to the way we had pursued this matter over the years at the UN. For example, on 3 April 1991, UNSCR 687 had given Saddam Hussein fifteen days to provide a declaration of his WMD. That demand had been repeated in August 1991 in UNSCR 707, in October 1991 in UNSCR 715, and again in December 1999 in UNSCR 1284. The PMOS pointed out that these were only some of the Resolutions dealing with the matter. Saddam had been given countless opportunities to comply with his international obligations. UNSCR 1441was the culmination of that process. It was now six months since President Bush had taken the decision to go down the UN route UN, and almost four months since Resolution 1441 had been passed. The key issue here was not a question of time. It was a question of a fundamental change of heart on the part of Saddam. He had to answer in a simple and direct way the questions being put to him by the UN weapons inspectors, particularly in terms of the ‘leftovers’ identified by UNSCOM. What had happened to the 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent? What had happened to the 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals? What had happened to the growth media procured for the manufacture of biological weapons? What had happened to the 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents? This was not a game of Call My Bluff. This process was for real. The time gap between the tabling of the draft Resolution and the UN’s vote presented a final window of opportunity for Saddam. Twelve years of playing games must now come to an end. We were determined to state the choice as clearly as possible. Peace or not. It was up to Saddam to decide.
Asked the purpose of the Prime Minister’s meeting with the Archbishop of Canterbury in Downing Street later today, the PMOS said it was routine, but no doubt the issue of Iraq would be discussed. The Prime Minister would repeat the argument he had put forward in his press conference following the Anglo-Italian Summit in Rome on Friday. He would say that of course we all shared the moral concerns about war and potential war. That was why he had said he would do everything in his power to try to prevent it. In the end, however, the choice was Saddam’s. It was also important for people to recognise the moral consequences of doing nothing, of leaving Saddam in the possession of WMD and of allowing him to continue to terrorise the Iraqi people. The PMOS reminded journalists that there had been 2 million casualties in the Iran/Iraq war which, it should be remembered, had been started by Saddam. 100,000 people had also died in the Anfal campaign in 1998 in Iraqi Kurdistan and 5,000 people had died in the Halabja chemical weapons attack in 1988. Clearly there were real moral issues about the state of Iraq today which had to be addressed - as well as the possible consequences of war. That said, peace was not a lost cause. Peace could still be won but it would mean Saddam realising that this time things were different. This time he had to make a choice. Asked whether the Prime Minister would be meeting Church of Scotland leaders, the PMOS said he was not aware of any plans for him to do so.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister believed that he had persuaded the Russians, Mexicans and Chileans of his case following his telephone calls at the weekend, the PMOS said that it was for the Russians, Mexicans and Chileans to speak for themselves. He underlined that it was essential for there to be a clear debate within the UN. As we had said in the run-up to 1441, the important thing was what people did when it came to the vote rather than their perceived position at this stage of the process. People recognised that Resolution 1441 was clear and unambiguous in what it asked Saddam to do, namely to comply fully and immediately. Thus, it was not simply a question of whether he complied. There was also the question regarding the credibility of the UN process and whether Resolutions as clear cut at 1441 were actually carried through to their logical conclusion. Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister was planning to speak to President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder given it appeared that he had given up on further discussions with them, the PMOS said he did not accept the premise of the question. Discussions at various levels were continuing, not least around the table in New York this afternoon, involving all the relevant UN members. Nor would he rule out the possibility of further telephone conversations with President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder.
Asked when the motion for Wednesday’s Parliamentary debate on Iraq would be announced, the PMOS said he expected we would know what the motion was within the next twenty-four hours. Asked whether the Prime Minister wanted the vote in the House on Wednesday to be viewed as an endorsement of the use of force in the last resort, the PMOS pointed out that we were not yet at the point of war. Moreover, the Resolution being tabled at the UN this week was a draft Resolution. Therefore, Wednesday’s debate could not be a debate about a final UN Resolution or about war. It would be about the Government’s approach to the issue of disarmament through the UN and its attempts to persuade Saddam to have the fundamental change of heart necessary to allow us to avoid war. Asked if he was saying that the Prime Minister would not regard an overwhelming vote in his favour as an endorsement of the use of force in the last resort if we reached that position, the PMOS said that everyone was aware of our position on Iraq. As we had underlined many times, we would do everything we could to avoid war. However, if the threat of military action was the only way through which Saddam could be forced to comply with his obligations, then so be it. In the end, the choice was his.
Questioned as to whether MPs would be given another chance in the future to vote against a war with Iraq, the PMOS cautioned journalists against getting too ahead of themselves. He also took the opportunity to point out again that the only reason why the weapons inspectors had been allowed back into Iraq was precisely because of the threat of military force. We had only made the progress we had made as a result of the action we had taken so far and our continuing determination to follow that through. Pressed as to whether Wednesday’s debate was the last chance MPs would be given to vote on a process which was ‘likely’ to lead to war in the end, the PMOS said that we were taking things step by step and were taking great care not to get too ahead of ourselves. We were not yet at the stage of declaring war. We were at the stage of tabling a draft Resolution in the UN to give Saddam a last chance to comply. Asked whether the Prime Minister was intending to speak to backbench MPs over the next forty-eight hours, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any plans for him to do so.
Asked whether this last window of opportunity for Saddam was an ultimatum, the PMOS said that a draft Resolution was being tabled at the UN this week. There would then be a clearly defined window in which Saddam had to indicate whether he was willing to comply. We had been waiting twelve years for his answer. It had been six months since President Bush had turned to the UN and four months since Resolution 1441 had been agreed unanimously. The message to Saddam was clear and direct. It was now up to him to make a decision.
Questioned about Hans Blix’s report to the UN on Friday, the PMOS said that the report would be delivered within the framework of Resolution 1284 which had been passed in December 1999, under which Dr Blix was obligated to provide a written report to the UN every three months. It was up to Dr Blix himself to decide whether he wanted to deliver a report under Resolution 1284 this Friday and then make a further presentation under Resolution 1441 at a later stage, or whether he wanted to amalgamate the two. That would be decided at the UN over the next few days. After that, in early to mid March, the UN would vote on the new Resolution.
Asked if the Prime Minister recognised the ‘Armageddon’ scenario described by John Major yesterday in which Saddam Hussein could launch an attack on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Israel if military action was launched against him, the PMOS said that it was difficult to predict with any accuracy precisely what Saddam might do. Of course it went without saying that military planning would take account of any such eventuality. It was also important to remember the number of casualties suffered during Saddam’s brutal twenty five years in power, including the two million in the Iran/Iraq war, the 100,000 people who had died in the Anfal campaign in 1998 in Iraqi Kurdistan and the 5,000 people who had died in the Halabja chemical weapons attack in 1988. Iraq should not be seen as a normal, peaceful, prosperous country which it could well have been were it not for Saddam Hussein. It was a country in which the population were living in terror. It was therefore clear that if we did reach the stage of war the result would be better for the Iraqi people, not worse.
Asked to provide details of how we envisaged Iraq might be governed in the immediate future post-Saddam and what the prospects were for the medium term, the PMOS acknowledged the legitimacy of the question being asked but pointed out that we had not yet reached the point where war was inevitable. A lot of work was going on behind the scenes relating both to a potential military campaign and what might happen afterwards. However, it was important to recognise that both were purely hypothetical at this point. Pressed further, the PMOS reiterated our commitment that a post-war Iraq, if that should come about, would remain a sovereign country and one entity. We had also underlined that any profits from oil production would be ploughed back into reconstructing the country which had been devastated by Saddam’s rule over the past twenty five years. These were the important principles. How they might work out in practice was the subject of detailed discussions currently taking place.
Questioned as to whether the UK would allow Saddam to continue in power as long as he had no WMD, the PMOS said that the short answer to the question was yes - as much as it might stick in our throats to say so. He pointed out that an Iraqi regime which did not depend on WMD to terrorise its own people would be a very different kind of regime to the one we were currently seeing. Of course, allowing Saddam to continue in power was not something anyone would want. Such a scenario, however, was the logical outcome of our position. That was why Saddam had been given a last chance to comply with his obligations. It was also why we were absolutely clear that this was his last chance for peace and our last push for peace. Asked why Saddam should believe that this was his last chance for peace given the position of the French, the PMOS said that it was precisely because of recent events that we needed to be absolutely clear about what was required of Saddam. This was a dictator and tyrant who, for twelve years, had managed to avoid making the choice he now had to make. We were making it absolutely clear to him that the time was up. He had to make his decision now. No more game playing.
Questioned as to whether the Government would follow the example of Australia and send out booklets to the general public advising them on what to do in the event of a chemical or biological attack, the PMOS said that civil contingency planning was continuing, as you would expect. Any information which needed to be issued would be done so at the appropriate time and in the appropriate way. Events at Heathrow in recent weeks showed that we would respond appropriately as the threat level rose and fell.
Hartlepool Mail
Asked if the Prime Minister had made any phonecalls to any employees of Johnston Press in an attempt to oust the Editor of the Hartlepool Mail, as reported in the Mail on Sunday, the PMOS said that he had dealt with the story over the weekend. The answer was no. He had nothing further to add.
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