Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Meetings and Iraq.
Meetings
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister would be meeting Prime Minister Meles of Ethiopia this afternoon. Mr Meles was in the UK to give evidence to the International and Development Select Committee. No doubt the progress which had been made on NEPAD would be discussed. The Prime Minister was also due to meet the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, following Mr Fischer’s meeting with Jack Straw earlier in the day. The Prime Minister would also be seeing King Abdullah of Jordan in the latest in a series of talks between the two of them taking stock of the situation in the Middle East and Iraq.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister was meeting General Tommy Franks today, the PMOS confirmed that other meetings were taking place this morning relating to the issue of Iraq. Asked why he was being so reticent in answering the question being put, the PMOS said that while we drew attention to some meetings, we didn’t do so with others.
Iraq
PM Statement
Asked whether the Prime Minister would have anything new to say about Iraq in his Statement to the House this afternoon, the PMOS said that he had no intention of pre-empting the Statement. Journalists didn’t have long to wait to hear the Prime Minister’s words. Questioned further, the PMOS said that the purpose of today’s Statement was to update Parliament following the Special European Council which had taken place last Monday and subsequent developments. The issue remained how best to disarm Saddam. Obviously we continued to want to achieve disarmament through peaceful means - hence the current final push for that to happen.
French/German/Russian Paper
Asked for a reaction to the counter proposal issued to the UN in the form of a Memorandum by France, Germany and Russia last night following the tabling of the new draft Resolution, the PMOS said it was clear that a vigorous debate was taking place within the Security Council. Although different positions had been adopted, we remained firmly of the view that it was important for the Prime Minister to continue a dialogue with other senior European figures. We were not pretending we were in complete agreement with the French, Germans and Russians in every respect. Evidently we were not. Nevertheless, they were entitled to put forward their proposals, which we were perfectly sanguine and relaxed about. However, it was important to ask the question - what did the French/German/Russian paper issued last night tell us? Firstly, and most importantly, it made it crystal clear that Saddam Hussein was not co-operating with the weapons inspectors as required by Resolution 1441. Under the terms of 1441, that meant complying actively, fully and immediately. Self evidently, Saddam Hussein was not doing so. It was therefore important for people to confront the logic of that position. 1441 had set out the fact that Saddam was being presented with a final opportunity to comply, focussing, as it had, on the need for full and active co-operation. It had not talked about it being a penultimate opportunity. Last night’s Memorandum had stated that the Security Council should "step up its efforts to give a real chance to the peaceful settlement of the crisis". It was worth pointing out that Saddam himself was now being given a final chance to bring about a peaceful settlement - and in fact had been given similar opportunities to do so for the past few months, if not years. Clearly it was Saddam’s call. He could decide now if he wanted to. Ultimately this was not a question of time, but of attitude. For example, South Africa had taken some two years to disarm with only nine inspectors. That was because they were serious about the issue. The PMOS also took the opportunity to draw journalists’ attention to the Conclusions of the European Council, signed by all fifteen EU members, which stated that "Baghdad should have no illusions. It must disarm and co-operate immediately and fully. Iraq has a final opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. The Iraqi regime will be responsible for the consequences if it continues to flout the will of the international community and does not take this last chance". Clearly all EU member states were in agreement. 1441 was about disarmament through UNMOVIC. It was important for people to understand that the inspections were not an end in themselves - they were a means to an end. As we had said consistently, it was not the job of the weapons inspectors to sniff out WMD given the vast size of Iraq. It was for Saddam to co-operate actively. We continued to hope that he would do so within the final window of opportunity which had now been presented to him. We did not believe, as this joint document appeared to indicate, that the way to resolve this whole issue was simply by putting in more inspectors inside Iraq.
Asked if the Prime Minister believed that there was any dispute as to whether or not Iraq possessed illegal WMD, given it appeared to be that issue which was the main bone of contention between the UK, US and Spain on the one hand and France, Germany and Russia on the other, the PMOS reminded journalists that the Prime Minister had pointed out to all European leaders attending the Special European Council last week that none of their associated intelligence agencies believed that Iraq did not have WMD. It was pretty clear from the seventeen UN Security Council Resolutions on this matter - in addition to Resolution 1441 - where the international community’s centre of gravity lay on this issue. It was also worth remembering that Dr ElBaradei had said some weeks ago that, given the whole history of this issue, Iraq was essentially guilty and had to prove its own innocence by co-operating 100%. He had said that 99% was not enough. If Saddam was claiming that he had no WMD, then it was up to him to satisfy Hans Blix and Dr ElBaradei that that was the case. He was now being given a final opportunity to do so. Put to him that he appeared to be implying that France, Germany and Russia were being disingenuous because they seemed to be saying that the case was not proven against Iraq, the PMOS said that Saddam had to be disarmed of his WMD. Everyone was in agreement about that. Last night’s Memorandum stated that "While suspicions remain, no evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses WMD or capabilities in this field". If that was their view, he hoped it also their view that clearly the onus was on Iraq, not the inspectors, to provide the necessary proof. In signing up to 1441, the UN had agreed unanimously to give Saddam a final opportunity through full and active co-operation and compliance. This was about a question of will and attitude. There was still an opportunity for Saddam to disarm voluntarily. However, that required a change of heart and a change of mind. It remained Saddam’s choice.
Asked whether the UK would veto the French/German/Russian proposals if that was the only way to prevent it gaining momentum, the PMOS said that as he understood it, the proposals had been set out in a Memorandum rather than a Resolution. It was simply a document. Asked if we were expecting it to become a Resolution or a motion, the PMOS said that that was a question to ask the French and others.
Al-Samoud Missiles
Asked how seriously we viewed Saddam’s reported reluctance to destroy his al-Samoud missiles, the PMOS said that this was classic Saddam. It was part of the same game he had been playing for years - to divide the international community, to eke out concessions at the last minute and present them as a great triumph. He added that, as night followed day, he would predict that Saddam would play the same somewhat tired game of will-he/won’t he and then, just before Hans Blix delivered his report to the UN, he would destroy the al-Samoud missile - in the meantime having tried to turn it into the one issue against which he should be judged. He had played such games year after year and we were wise to them. It was important for people to recognise that this was not just about the al-Samoud missile. It was about hundreds, indeed thousands, of tonnes of some of the deadliest weapons in the world which had been unaccounted for, including, for example, the 8,500 missiles which UNSCOM had been unable to verify in 1998.
Second Resolution
Asked if the Prime Minister felt that the UK was closer to or further away from achieving the required votes to gain a second Resolution, the PMOS said no one was suggesting that there weren’t differences of view within the Security Council. Clearly there were, but it was important for people to be patient and wait and see how events unfolded in the time to come. He underlined again that the whole point of Resolution 1441 was not to use UNMOVIC to contain Saddam Hussein. Rather, UNMOVIC should be used as a means for disarmament. If people were serious about disarming, they could have as much time as they wanted, as the experience of South Africa had shown. Time was not an issue if the will was there. People would have to confront the logic of the Resolution they had signed up to in the absence of co-operation by Iraq. Asked if it would matter to the Prime Minister if the French vetoed a second Resolution, the PMOS repeated that it was important to wait and see how things panned out. As the Prime Minister had said repeatedly in the past, a second Resolution was desirable and preferable. 1441 had given Saddam a final opportunity to comply. That opportunity remained open for the moment. However, in the Prime Minister’s view, Resolution 1441 had to mean what it said.
Asked if the Prime Minister was concerned about Hans Blix’s reported comment today about wanting more time, the PMOS said that Dr Blix was due to present a report to the UN early next month. We would wait and see what he said. As the Prime Minister had underlined repeatedly, in the absence of full and active co-operation as well as the necessary will and attitude, the time required was the time required to make a judgement as to whether Saddam was serious or not.
Parliament/Vote
Asked whether a parliamentary vote authorising military action would be taken before or after the event, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had answered this question during his session with the Liaison Committee last month. There were clearly issues relating to the security of our forces. The Prime Minister’s Statement today and tomorrow’s debate both illustrated the Government’s desire to continue to keep Parliament informed. In addition, as Jack Straw had pointed out this morning, tomorrow’s vote would not be a vote on the adjournment. It would be a substantive motion. In his Business Statement yesterday, the Leader of the House had stated what tomorrow’s debate would be about, namely the Government’s strategy in terms of Resolution 1441. People shouldn’t get too ahead of themselves at this point. It was important to take things one stage at a time. Asked to explain in what way a vote to authorise military action would compromise the security of our forces or reduce any element of surprise, the PMOS pointed out that we were not yet at the stage of military action. No decision had been taken. Indeed, the Prime Minister would underline today that there was still an opportunity for the issue to be resolved through peaceful disarmament if Saddam faced up to his responsibilities. We could deal with that if and when we had to.
Televised Debate
Asked if there was any chance that the Prime Minister would take part in a televised debate with Saddam Hussein, the PMOS said that he hadn’t heard that idea being discussed. In our view, Saddam would be better off spending a little less time on his communications strategy and more time on his co-operation and conversations with UNMOVIC.
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