Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq.
Iraq
Meetings
Asked whether the Prime Minister had met General Tommy Franks this morning, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that the Prime Minister had had a number of meetings on Iraq today. We were not providing details about them all. Asked if he was refusing to confirm the meeting because Downing Street did not want people to think that military action against Iraq was imminent, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister met representatives from the military from time to time. It wasn’t our normal practice necessarily to draw attention to such meetings. There was nothing particularly significant in the way we were handling this matter. Were such a meeting to have taken place, no doubt journalists could predict what would have been discussed. Put to him that the Pentagon had confirmed the meeting was taking place, the PMOS said it was widely known that General Franks was in London at the current time. Put to him that he was creating a conspiracy theory by refusing to confirm the meeting, the PMOS said he would disagree.
PM’s Statement/Second UN Resolution
Asked if there was any significance in the Prime Minister’s substitution of the word ‘confident’ for ‘hope’ in talking about achieving a second UN Resolution in his Statement to the Commons today, the PMOS said he wouldn’t over-interpret the Prime Minister’s words or get hung up on semantics. What the Prime Minister had said in the past about this issue remained on the record. He continued to maintain strongly that there was a logic to Resolution 1441 which set down that there should be full and immediate compliance, active - not passive - co-operation, and that serious consequences would follow if that did not happen. A debate about this matter was currently taking place at the Security Council and it was clear that not everyone was on the same page. Nevertheless, the terms of 1441 were crystal clear and the Prime Minister remained confident in the logic of what people had signed up to.
Pressed as to whether the Prime Minister continued to ‘expect’ a second UN Resolution, despite not using the word in his Statement today, the PMOS pointed out that we would not have tabled a second Resolution, together with the Spanish and US Administrations, if we did not think that the logic of 1441 could be upheld if it came to it. It didn’t matter whether the Prime Minister used the words ‘hope’, ‘expectation’ or ‘confidence’. No one who had heard his Statement today would be able to doubt his total conviction in the argument that he had mounted. He repeated that people would also be hard-pressed not to acknowledge the logic of the UN process on which we were currently embarked. Prior to achieving the first Resolution, many had people had said we would not be able to do it. They had been proven wrong by the 15-0 result. Of course, no one was pretending that we were expecting the same thing to happen should it come to a vote on a second Resolution. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister remained convinced and confident in the integrity of the UN process and, given the logic of the argument, believed that others would feel the same way.
Asked to clarify the meaning of the term ‘unreasonable veto’ in relation to the second Resolution, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had answered this question today. His words spoke for themselves. We would have to wait and see how the process developed, where countries ended up and whether people would in fact exercise a veto.
Questioned further about the language the Prime Minister had used in his Statement today, the PMOS said that given a draft Resolution had been tabled at the UN and that a Memorandum outlining other proposals had been published by France, Germany and Russia at the same time, we acknowledged the desire on the part of the media to start trying to predict the position different countries might adopt further down the line and following a report from Hans Blix which we did not yet know the content of. It would be better if people exercised a little patience and waited to see how events unfolded. He knew journalists wanted to play the numbers game. It was easy copy but didn’t really take us anywhere.
Asked how we would react should Dr Blix’s conclusions be an ‘inconvenience’ for us, the PMOS said that it was important to wait and see what happened. The Prime Minister could not have been clearer in spelling out what had to happen. In the past, Dr ElBaradei had talked about the need for 100% compliance, underlining that 99% was not enough. The Prime Minister had echoed those sentiments in his Statement today saying, "Resolution 1441 called for full and immediate compliance - not 10%, not 20%, not even 50%, but 100%". Over the course of the next week or so we could probably anticipate that Saddam would drip-feed further concessions to try to string the process along and divide the international community - just as he had been doing over the past twelve years. The PMOS said that he would bet the bank, for example, that Saddam would agree to destroy his al-Samoud missiles after having tried to make it the one issue upon which his co-operation should be judged. In our view, 100% co-operation meant 100% co-operation. It did not mean giving a concession here and another concession there. We were providing Saddam with a further final opportunity to comply with his international obligations. That meant that we were giving him a further final opportunity for 100% compliance. Nothing less would do.
Asked for a reaction to reports from the US that the American Administration had only agreed to the draft Resolution in order to help the Prime Minister out, the PMOS said that such a suggestion followed people’s prediction last summer that the US would act unilaterally and that they would eschew the UN route. The view that they had no interest in the solidarity of the international community as embodied by the UN was clearly wrong. If a judgement was taken that Saddam was in breach of the first Resolution, it was only logical to draw up another one to take things further forward. Questioned further about the reports from the US, the PMOS said that he had not seen what was being alluded to. However, it was clear both the UK and US Governments had been determined that, wherever possible, the process should be carried out under the auspices of the UN.
Parliamentary Debate
Asked if the Prime Minister would accept Donald Anderson’s amendment on tomorrow’s motion, the PMOS said that a Government motion had been tabled. It was for the Speaker to make a judgement about what amendments he took. The Government took the position that a further final opportunity was being presented to Saddam to comply with his obligations. Hans Blix was due to present a report to the UN early next month. We had indicated that, subsequent to the report, there could be a vote on the Resolution which had been framed.
Asked if the Prime Minister felt comfortable with the fact that the most glowing praise for the way he was handling the issue of Iraq had come from Opposition MPs today while threats of rebellion were coming from his own backbenchers, the PMOS said that he wasn’t sure the centre of gravity was entirely as described. There were clearly some differences of view on all sides of the House. At a time like this, the Prime Minister believed it was important to take the opportunity to set out the full rounded argument, to explain to people why we were at the point we were at, the issues confronting this Government and the international community and the price of inaction. That was what today had been about. He had listened respectfully to dissenting views, as you would expect, and continued to mount his arguments mindful of the fact that he didn’t have monopoly of wisdom but a conviction in what he believed to be right.
Saddam Hussein
Asked to explain the moral logic in saying previously that Saddam should be removed from power, and then stating this week that he could remain in power if he complied with his international obligations, the PMOS reminded journalists that at the time of the anti-war march in London, protestors had been mounting a particular argument regarding the moral case for not going to war. Not unreasonably, the Prime Minister had mounted a counter argument, pointing out that, should it come to conflict, there was another side to the balance sheet and that there was no moral monopoly. His view had not changed. Asked to explain why the Prime Minister believed Saddam should be allowed to stay in power if he complied with 1441 having gone to extreme lengths to emphasise his brutal regime, the PMOS said that successive UN Resolutions had principally focussed on the issue of disarmament. As we had said, if Saddam complied and co-operated fully and disarmed then - no matter how loathsome - he could stay in place. On the other hand, if he chose to continue to defy the will of the international community and we ended up in a conflict situation, we should be able to approach it confident in the knowledge that Iraq would be better off without Saddam. The two positions were not inconsistent. It was also important to understand that if Saddam disarmed, his regime, by definition, would be different as there would be no WMD. Asked if it would fold given our view he depended on his WMD, the PMOS said that we would have to wait and see what happened.
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