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Thursday 27 February 2003

PMOS morning briefing - 27 February

Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Northern Ireland, Anglo-Spanish Summit, Iraq and Asylum.

Northern Ireland

The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister would be meeting the Taoiseach today to review progress to date.

Anglo-Spanish Summit

The PMOS informed journalists that the Prime Minister would be departing for Spain later today to attend the Anglo-Spanish Summit. He was due to have dinner with Prime Minister Aznar this evening and would also join him for breakfast tomorrow morning, following which a press conference would take place.

Asked the purpose for the summit and if the timing of it was significant, the PMOS said that the meeting would have happened in any event. However, it was timely and Iraq was likely to dominate the proceedings. That said, other topics would be discussed, such as the issue of economic reform, where there was a lot of common ground, and the emerging findings of the Laeken Convention which would be put to the European Council in June.

Iraq

The Prime Minister had spoken to the Prime Minister of Bulgaria yesterday evening, as well as the Prime Minister of Canada. Referring to President Bush’s speech overnight, he pointed to the fact that the President had recommitted himself to a two-state solution in the Middle East and had set out a strong statement in respect of settlements. He had said that we would continue to underline the importance of making progress in the Middle East peace process.

The Prime Minister himself had also made a speech at a private event last night which had underlined these themes. We had issued a text. He had emphasised the importance of addressing the humanitarian issues and planning for contingencies and had noted that work was continuing in this regard. He said that we would continue to mount arguments on the nature of the threats, the nature of the regime and the importance of the integrity of the UN process.

He said it should come as no surprise to anyone that the Cabinet’s support for the Government’s position remained rock solid. However, the Prime Minister was under no illusion about the strength of feeling held in certain quarters. We were continuing to listen to people’s views, as you would expect, and would do so with respect. He had also underlined the value he attached to the maturity and detail of yesterday’s debate in the House. Many of those who had voted against the Government had been reflecting the anxieties felt by some of their constituents.

Asked whether the Government’s policy would change, the PMOS said that the policy remained as had been set down. The Prime Minister believed with an absolute passion that the twin threats of WMD and international terrorism were now the major challenge to the security of the world. He believed that tyrants such as Saddam Hussein had to be confronted and made to face their responsibilities as set down by the international community. Equally he believed with a passion in the importance of the United Nations and felt that the word of the UN had to mean what it said or else it would crumble into irrelevance. Obviously we would all prefer it if we did not have to deal with these issues. However, they existed. Everyone hoped the difficulties could be resolved peacefully - and indeed it was still possible for that to happen. However, the threat from the poisons, viruses and toxins in Iraq were real and could not be wished away. Government and leadership was about confronting the difficult issues. It was about taking difficult decisions and having the courage and resolve to see things through. Of course that did not mean that we automatically dismissed the counter arguments which people were making. On the contrary. We would continue to listen respectfully to the views being expressed. However, it was important for people to recognise that yesterday’s vote had shown that the majority of Parliament supported the Government’s position, as did the majority of the Government’s party. Consequently, if people were suggesting that this was a story about the view of Parliament and democratically expressed opinions, it was important to ensure that it was not only the dissenting voices that were given airtime. The views held by those who supported the Government’s stance were no less strongly held.

Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister would take the opportunity over the next couple of days to speak directly about the rebellion he had experienced last night, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister would continue to mount the arguments and explain the Government’s position. No one was pretending this was anything other than a difficult and testing time. However as had been pointed out, this was not a situation involving an innocent man whose guilt had to be proven by the detective agency that was UNMOVIC. UNMOVIC was not a detective agency. Nor was Saddam, or his regime, innocent. They had already been condemned as guilty by the UN, as Dr ElBaradei himself had said. As a result, in was their duty under the terms of Resolution 1441 to co-operate fully in a process of disarmament with UNMOVIC. People were saying that Saddam should be given more time. As the Prime Minister had said on Tuesday, he could change his mind today if he wanted to. In the end, leaders had to take decisions and do what they believed was right. Obviously that did not mean that the Prime Minister would not continue to listen carefully and with respect to the counter arguments people were making.

Asked if he would agree that the Prime Minister’s commitment to listen carefully and with respect to dissenting voiced would not translate into any change of heart on his part, the PMOS said that, ultimately, Government was all about making decisions. Resolution 1441, agreed some twelve years after the last Gulf War in 1991, called for full, immediate and active compliance. Four months had elapsed since 1441 had been passed and, as Hans Blix had noted yesterday, it was still unclear whether Saddam wanted to co-operate or not. As the Prime Minister had underlined from the outset, a judgement had to be taken as to how much time we should give the process before saying one way or the other whether Saddam was prepared to co-operate. No doubt he would destroy his al-Samoud missiles within the next few days after trying to turn that into the great issue on which his co-operation should be judged. Perhaps he might even find some more documents or even another bomb lying around somewhere as well. Some concessions would be dripped out. It was abundantly clear that unless there was a fundamental change of heart and will, we were not going to see full disarmament as required under Resolution 1441.

Asked if the Prime Minster believed that those who did not accept his view were misguided and what was the single major issue they had concerns about, the PMOS said that there were clearly different strands of opinion. Journalists were just as able to write a political commentary as he was. Of course there were natural anxieties in dealing with issues as big as the ones we were facing. However, as the Prime Minister had said many times, this was a threat we had to deal with and it was important to uphold the will of the UN in doing so.

Asked if he would agree with the suggestion that the size of last night’s rebellion would strengthen the Prime Minister’s hand when it came to persuading the US to stick to the UN route, or whether this was a positive spin on a bad result, the PMOS said that he did not agree with the way some people were trying to caricature the situation. Last August, people had predicted that the UN would be bypassed and that an invasion of Iraq was imminent. Evidently that had turned out not to be the case. President Bush had made a speech to the UN, which had been followed by the unanimous agreement of Resolution 1441. It was now our duty to make sure that the Resolution meant what it said. A further draft Resolution was currently being circulated. While it was not being put to a vote at this stage, it was clear that the text would not have been drawn up if the countries concerned were not serious about the UN process. 1441 was about full, immediate and active co-operation. The judgement had to be taken at some point as to whether that was happening or not.

Put to him that other countries were discussing the potential implications of no second resolution, the PMOS pointed out that we were not yet at that stage. As we had underlined many times, there was a desire and a determination to secure a second Resolution - and the Prime Minister himself remained of the view that the logic of the argument dictated that it would happen.

Asked when Hans Blix would deliver his next report to the UN, the PMOS said that as he understood it, Hans Blix was obliged to present a quarterly written report under the terms of Resolution 1284. That might happen at the end of this week. The next oral report under the terms of Resolution 1441 would be in early March, probably at the end of next week. It was up to the UN administrators to decide when it might take place.

Questioned as to whether a vote at the UN on a second Resolution would only be had following a report to the UN by Dr Blix under 1441, the PMOS said yes. Asked the situation in relation to further votes in the House, the PMOS drew journalists’ attention to Jack Straw’s assurance to the House yesterday that, "We will put any decision on military action to the House, and the time will be subject only to the usual caveats about the safety of our forces….It was as much in the Government’s interest as it was in the paramount interests of the House that we should do that before the start of any hostilities….In addition, there will be Oral Statements to the House on the business of the Security Council and a full opportunity to debate and vote on the outcome of proceedings on any second Resolution".

Asked if he agreed it would be an advantage for the Prime Minister to begin to outlining publicly what sort of regime might be put in place in Iraq post-Saddam, the PMOS said yes - but at an appropriate time. It was important not to lose sight of the fact that there was still a narrow window of opportunity for Saddam to comply. Equally, he should not underestimate the determination of the international community to enforce its will.

Asked for a reaction to reports from the US that President Bush’s comments in his speech last night regarding a post-Saddam Iraq and the Middle East had been made at the urging of the Prime Minister, the PMOS reminded journalists that President Bush had set out a very cogent and important statement on the Middle East last summer. Last night’s speech was a welcome amplification of those ideas. It was no secret that the Prime Minister wasted no opportunity in raising the importance of the Middle East peace process with world leaders whenever he could. He had discussed the with President Bush at their last meeting.

Asked to clarify the Prime Minister’s present position on what might constitute an ‘unreasonable veto’ at the UN, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had been making the point that the Security Council had set down its will. If Iraq was in material breach - as we had already said it was - the UN’s will should be enforced. He added that he did not think it would be particularly helpful to get into a discussion about ‘what if….’ scenarios at this stage. We would have to wait and see what happened. Put to him that last night’s vote had made the ‘unreasonable veto’ option politically impossible in the domestic context, the PMOS said that the position had not changed. The second Resolution would be put to a vote if it was appropriate to do so. In the meantime, we would continue to discuss the issue with Security Council members. The Prime Minister expected there to be a second Resolution. He had been adamant from the outset about the need to go down the UN route if at all possible. However, as he had underlined many times, that had to be a way of dealing with the issue of Saddam and his WMD, not avoiding it given he was in violation of UN resolutions.

Asked to explain what action the Prime Minister was going to take to obtain a second Resolution, the PMOS said that he would continue to have an intensive dialogue with his partners on the Security Council. For example, he had spoken to the Bulgarian Prime Minister yesterday and would be meeting Prime Minister Aznar of Spain later today. No doubt he would have other conversations. There were also contacts going on through other parts of the Government and a lot of work was taking place at the UN. This was all about underlining to people the logic of the argument and the integrity of the process. It was important for the international community to send a strong message to Saddam to prevent the UN fading into irrelevance because it had been unable to uphold its edicts. Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister would be speaking to the countries which ‘really’ mattered, such as the Russians and the French, the PMOS said that there were no plans he could point to at this stage. However, there were fourteen other members of the Security Council.

Put to him that if the Prime Minister was confident of achieving a second Resolution he must therefore be confident of being able to the change the minds of the Russians and the French, the PMOS said the Prime Minister believed that, in the end, people would have to confront the logic of a Resolution to which they had signed up. No one was suggesting that we would get another 15-0 result in a vote on a second Resolution. Equally, it was not a question of turning 1441 into 1284. 1441 was not about containment through inspections. It was about disarmament through active co-operation. That was a fundamental difference and was precisely why 1441 had been tabled. As Dr ElBaradei had said, Saddam had been declared guilty by the international community. He must therefore either prove his innocence to their satisfaction or else actively co-operate in disarmament - otherwise he must be disarmed. That was the logic of the argument. There was no use in trying to turn Resolution 1441 into something it was not. At the moment it was clear that Saddam was not co-operating actively. We remained firmly of the view that putting in more inspectors would not change anything. South Africa, for example, had taken two years to disarm with only nine inspectors. Iraq could have as long as it wanted to disarm, provided they had the will to do so.

Questioned as to whether the UK regreted having ’sold’ 1441 to the French on the basis that it would not be sufficient to go to war and that another Resolution would be needed further down the line, the PMOS said he wouldn’t characterise the situation like that. These were difficult issues which the international community was trying to confront. A draft second Resolution was currently in circulation. The fifteen countries who had signed 1441 had signed up to full, immediate and active co-operation on the part of Saddam and that if there was a further material breach then serious consequences would follow. The draft second Resolution talked about a final opportunity. We were talking about a further final opportunity at the moment.

Asked if the Prime Minister would be ‘comfortable’ in going to war effectively ‘propped up’ by Opposition MPs, the PMOS said that it was important to wait and see what happened. Yesterday’s vote had not been a vote on a second Resolution. Of course that was not to understate the nature of it. However, it was clear that a majority of Parliament was in favour of the Government’s policy, as was the majority of the Government’s party. It was also important for people to acknowledge that the views of those who had voted in support of the Government were just as strong as those who had not.

Questioned about the suggestion that Saddam could go into exile, the PMOS said that the idea had been around for some time and had emerged from the Arab world. As the Prime Minister had told the House on Tuesday, Saddam could get rid of his WMD and stay in power or go into exile. However, what he could not do was avoid disarming.

Asylum

Asked about the asylum figures due to be published tomorrow, the PMOS said that they were figures for October to December 2002. It was recognised that last year had been a difficult year in terms of the abuse of the asylum system. The final quarter figures were always going to reflect that. That said, it was important to recognise that subsequent to October, we had seen the introduction of the Nationality and Immigration Act. There had also been significant changes in terms of the closure of Sangatte, the extension of the list of countries considered to be safe and the abolition of Exceptional Leave to Remain. As the Prime Minister had said, our target was to halve the number of applications - around 8,800 - from October 2002 to October 2003. We stood by that target. No one was under any illusion that the figures published tomorrow would be good. However, it was important to recognise that the trend since October was downward because of the measures which had been put in place.Previous press briefings

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