Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq.
Iraq
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) noted to journalists that we had been predicting since Tuesday that the Iraqis’ refusal to dismantle their al-Samoud missiles would turn out to be a game and would form part of their drip-feed of concessions strategy. We were now about to find out that that was indeed the case. Reports coming out of Iraq stated that Saddam was now saying he would agree to the dismantlement of the missiles within the next forty-eight hours. Since Tuesday, we had been predicting that that would happen because this was exactly how he played the concessions game. It was important for people to recognise that this was not the full, immediate co-operation that Resolution 1441 demanded. There was a difference between Resolution 1284, which set out a more open-ended timescale for co-operation, and Resolution 1441 which demanded immediate co-operation. Asked why he was dismissing the move as a game when it was something which the weapons inspectors had been pressing Saddam to do, the PMOS said that he was not dismissing anything. He was simply making the point that the action should not be confused with the full compliance required under the terms of Resolution 1441. Obviously 1441 had not required full disarmament overnight. However, it had stated clearly that there had to be full compliance - and a genuine intention to full compliance - across the board. He pointed out that it had taken the South African Government two years to dismantle its WMD - but had done so with only nine inspectors. It had been successful because there had been full co-operation between the South African Government and the inspections team. That was what was missing in Iraq. Asked if the Prime Minister believed that the al-Samoud missiles represented a very serious threat and that destroying them would be a significant achievement for the UN, the PMOS said that obviously the dismantlement of a weapon which was illegal under UN regulations was better than not dismantling it. However, the question was whether it went anywhere near signalling full compliance as required by Resolution 1441. In our view, the answer to that was no.
Put to him that Downing Street’s response to the move by the Iraqis today could be seen by some as an indication of the UK and US’s determination to go to war no matter what concessions the Iraqi regime agreed to, the PMOS said he would disagree. People need only look at the history of the past twelve years to see that Saddam’s strategy was to agree to apparent concessions at moments of maximum pressure and then withdraw them while he continued on his merry way of developing further WMD. We had to be realistic about this issue. This was not the first time we had been round this loop. We spoke from the bitter experience of the past twelve years. It was as long ago as April 1991, under Resolution 687, that Saddam had first been instructed by the UN to give a full and open declaration of his WMD. Twelve years on, it was not surprising that people were sceptical about his announcements - and it was precisely that scepticism which had resulted in the move from Resolution 1284 to Resolution 1441.
Asked again about the Cabinet’s discussion on Iraq this morning, the PMOS said that both the Prime Minister and Jack Straw had acknowledged that people had genuine concerns about the issue. However, given Saddam had been flouting the will of the international community for twelve years, it was clear that the issue of WMD had to be dealt with. Since August, the Prime Minister had delineated the UN route as the way to do that. Questioned further about the Cabinet’s discussion, the PMOS said that there had been a full, forty-minute discussion which had demonstrated solid support across the board for the Prime Minister’s position. Asked for further detail about the discussion on the need for a second Resolution, the PMOS said that the discussion had been led by the Prime Minister who had reiterated his belief that a second Resolution was still achievable and had explained how we intended to accomplish it. We had said from the outset that a second Resolution was both desirable and preferable. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that it was important to work together with other world leaders to achieve a second Resolution to allow us to exert the maximum pressure on Saddam in this period.
Asked to clarify the position regarding further votes on Iraq in the Commons, the PMOS said that the position remained as set out by the Prime Minister and Jack Straw in the House yesterday. He had nothing further to add to what they had already said about the matter. Put to him that the Prime Minister had talked about there being ‘many’ future occasions, whereas the Foreign Secretary had said there would only be ‘two’, the PMOS said that the Foreign Secretary had outlined two areas where he expected Parliament would want to express a view - one related to a second UN Resolution, while the other related to military action. On the latter, of course, there was a caveat inasmuch as we would not allow any debate to jeopardise the lives of our troops.
Asked if the Prime Minister had been surprised by the size of the rebellion last night, the PMOS said the Prime Minister recognised that there were concerns across the country about the consequences of war - and indeed shared them. Equally, however, he remained firmly of the view that doing nothing was not an option given the real dangers which Saddam posed to the rest of the world - including the UK - as long as he remained in possession of his WMD, and of the very real price which the Iraqi people continued to pay on a daily basis.
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