Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq/Clare Short.
Iraq/Clare Short
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) took the opportunity to update journalists on where we stood on Iraq. He said that the Prime Minister had spent a large part of his weekend at Chequers engaged in telephone calls to other world leaders, the last of which had taken place just before midnight last night. This morning, he had met the Foreign Secretary and Deputy Prime Minister and was clearing his diary from late this afternoon onwards in order to resume his latest round of international conversations. Baroness Amos was also departing for Africa later today to meet with the leaders of Angola, Cameroon and Guinea following her recent visit to the region. She was a familiar face there and was clearly a highly respected person because of her close involvement in the G8/NEPAD discussions. Doubtless she would want to update the African leaders on our thinking following the tabling of the draft Resolution at the UN. No doubt Jack Straw would also take the opportunity to update the House on progress at the UN in his Statement on Iraq at 3.30pm today. All this activity was designed to maximise support for the second Resolution, a revised draft of which the Foreign Secretary had circulated to the UN on Friday. Our approach centred on Hans Blix’s report last Friday, and in particular his comprehensive ‘clusters’ document, published at the time, which concluded that Saddam was still not meeting the standard set in Resolution 1441 - i.e. full and immediate co-operation. We still did not have the answers to the outstanding questions which had been posed. Where was the mustard gas? Where was the VX? Where was the anthrax? Scientists were still not being allowed to give interviews outside Iraq without the presence of observers from the Iraqi regime, despite the requirements set out explicitly in 1441. The PMOS added that the reports this morning in relation to Unmanned Aerial Vehicles - or drones - were also relevant. The ‘clusters’ document stated on page 14 that "recent inspections have also revealed the existence of a drone with a wingspan of 7.45 meters that has not been declared by Iraq. Officials at the inspections site stated that the drone had been test flown". This information underlined the reasoning behind our belief that a second Resolution was necessary. It was also why we believed that it was essential to maximise the pressure on Saddam. Our aim was to force him to the conclusion that this time it was different - this time there was no escaping the two options of either disarming or going into exile. In keeping with that, we were currently engaging in discussions with our colleagues on the Security Council. We were responding positively to proposals suggesting that we provided some detailed indicators which would outline precisely what Saddam had to do before the 17 March deadline. This would include identifying the key areas where progress had to be made so that the outstanding questions contained in the ‘clusters’ document would be answered. The PMOS said he was not going to get ahead of himself by speculating what the outcome of those discussions at the UN might be. That said, he thought it might be useful to sketch in the detail of our position. As Dr ElBaradei had said in his interview with Al Hayat today, "what we are asking for is a dramatic and fundamental change in spirit and substance". That was the key to the whole process.
Asked if the Prime Minister had spoken to Clare Short in the light of her comments in a BBC interview last night, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had spoken to Ms Short briefly last night and once again this morning. His focus, however, remained resolutely on achieving a second Resolution. This was what he had been working towards ever since he had identified the UN route as the way forward last August. Since then, he had been pressing the international community to follow this path on the basis that the UN was the right way to address the issue - as long as it was, indeed, a way of dealing with it, not avoiding it. Questioned as to whether it was tenable for a Cabinet Minister to suggest effectively that the Prime Minister was ‘a bit of a nutter’ and yet remain in the Cabinet, the PMOS noted the interesting characterisation of Ms Short’s comments but repeated that the Prime Minister was focussing his energy on achieving a second Resolution and would continue in that vein until he got it.
Asked if, given he had not sacked her, the Prime Minister agreed with Ms Short’s assessment that his behaviour had been ‘reckless’ and that launching military action against Iraq without a second Resolution would be a breach of international law undermining the UN, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had been surprised by Ms Short’s comments last night, particularly since she had not taken the opportunity to express them previously in a bilateral meeting the two had had last Friday. That said, the Prime Minister was continuing to focus his energy on building a consensus for a second Resolution. He had not heard the interview last night because, coincidentally, he had was in conversation with other world leaders. Put to him that Ms Short had stated categorically that she had informed the Prime Minister of her views two weeks ago - when the PMOS had told journalists that the Cabinet was ‘rock solid’ in support of the Prime Minister’s position, the PMOS said that he stood by what he and his colleague had said at the time. Put to him that Ms Short’s complaint was that her views had not been reflected in the Cabinet readout later, the PMOS said that the Government’s public and private lines were one and the same. We wanted to avoid war if at all possible and we wanted to go down the UN route. However, as the Prime Minister had underlined in his press conference in Sedgefield last September, the UN had to be a way to resolve the issue, not avoid it, if it was to retain its credibility. That was why we had been working so hard to abide by the UN process. At the same time, however, we had maintained consistently that if we were to make any progress, we had to send a very strong message to Saddam that his days of calling the bluff of the international community were over and we would not allow him to continue to play his games.
Asked which leaders the Prime Minister had spoken to over the weekend, the PMOS said that it would not be helpful to provide a running commentary of conversations the Prime Minister was having at this time. He was continuing his efforts to build support for a second Resolution because he believed that it was critical, not just for the future of Iraq, but also for the future credibility of the UN. He believed that no one should be sending a mixed signal to Saddam which would give him the impression that once again he could duck his responsibility in making a decision. It was important to maintain a unified pressure on him. Put to him that we were quite clearly not doing so and therefore whether the Prime Minister believed that Clare Short should be allowed to behave in the way she had by breaking the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister was determined not to be diverted by other issues at this stage. He was focussing his attention on building support for a second Resolution and would continue to do so.
Questioned as to whether Ms Short had offered to resign or whether the subject had been discussed in her conversations with the Prime Minister last night and this morning, the PMOS declined to get into the detail of the telephone calls. Suffice to say that the Prime Minister had emphasised to her, and indeed to everyone, the importance of achieving a second UN Resolution and doing nothing that might take the pressure off Saddam. Pressed as to whether the Prime Minister had decided not to sack Ms Short, the PMOS repeated that the Prime Minister’s attention remained focussed on efforts to achieve a second Resolution. He was determined not to be diverted onto other issues. Asked if it was right for journalists to assume that Ms Short would resign if we didn’t get a second Resolution, and that she would be sacked if we did, the PMOS said that this was pure speculation which he had no intention of fuelling. The Prime Minister was doing all he could to maintain a relentless focus on the strategy he had been pursuing since last summer when he had persuaded the international community to deal with the issue under the auspices of the UN. The current period was critical not only for the future of Iraq but, perhaps more importantly, for the future credibility of the UN as an international institution.
Questioned at so whether it would be correct to describe Ms Short as a ’semi-detached’ member of the Cabinet, the PMOS said that he had no wish to venture into the territory into which he was being invited. Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister had spoken to Ms Short again this morning because he had asked her to think through some issues which had arisen in their conversation the night before, the PMOS repeated that he had no intention of giving details of either conversation, other than to say that both had been relatively brief and the Prime Minister had set out his determination to pursue the UN route and allow nothing to divert him from that path. Asked if the Prime Minister wanted Ms Short to remain a member of the Cabinet, the PMOS reiterated that the Prime Minister remained absolutely focussed on the need to get a second Resolution. Pressed as to whether Ms Short’s retention of her Cabinet Minister status was helpful, the PMOS underlined the Prime Minister’s determination not to be diverted onto any other matter. He was continuing to remain focussed, purely and simply, on the need to get a second Resolution. Asked why he was refusing to answer the questions being put to him as the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman, the PMOS pointed out that since the Prime Minister was focussing exclusively on the need to achieve a second Resolution, he, as the Official Spokesman, was going to follow the Prime Minister’s lead. Put to him that Clare Short had ‘fatally undermined’ the Prime Minister’s attempt to remain focussed on achieving a second Resolution and that he should be answering the questions arising from her comments last night, the PMOS stressed that the Prime Minister had absolutely no intention of being diverted away from the need to focus on getting a second Resolution. This was the key, not only to building a consensus on Iraq, but also to the future credibility of the UN. Asked if he would agree it was odd that Ministers had hit back at Clare Short this morning and yet No 10 wasn’t commenting, the PMOS said that he would disagree with the premise of the question. Downing Street had expressed an opinion. We had underlined that the Prime Minister had a highly developed set of priorities, the most important of which was to get a second Resolution and build a consensus if possible.
Put to him that the Prime Minister’s apparent suspension of the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility on Iraq was sending a personal signal to Saddam Hussein that the international community was divided, the PMOS said that our priority was to ensure that Saddam received a strong message from the UN indicating that there was as much of a consensus as possible and that he had to either comply fully within a tight deadline, or else face conflict. It was only by forcing him to make that choice that the prospect of a military conflict could be avoided. That was the paradox for those calling for a delay. Clearly, it made it all the more important for people not to do or say anything which gave Saddam the impression that once again that he could duck his responsibility to make a choice. Asked if he would agree that that was precisely what Ms Short herself had done, the PMOS said that it was for others to make their own judgements.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister retained full confidence in Clare Short, the PMOS said he thought he had already answered that question. Put to him that he hadn’t, the PMOS said that he had answered the questions being put to him in the way he had chosen to do so. He had already set out the position and had nothing further to add. Asked if journalists could assume that the Prime Minister did not retain full confidence in Ms Short, the PMOS said that journalists would write whatever they wanted to write - that was their prerogative. His prerogative was to reflect the Prime Minister’s priorities. As of this week, his primary priority was to get a second Resolution. Put to him that it appeared Downing Street was effectively cutting Ms Short adrift, the PMOS said he would disagree. He was simply making the point that the Prime Minister remained focussed on the need for a second Resolution and was making that his priority this week. Questioned by the BBC as to whether the Prime Minister retained full confidence in Jack Straw, the PMOS awarded full marks to the journalist for imagination and creativity, but said he thought that people would understand if he declined to play any games today.
Asked what advice the Prime Minister had sought and received on the legality of any military action against Saddam Hussein without a second Resolution, the PMOS reminded journalists that it wasn’t our policy to provide a running commentary on legal advice from the Government’s Law Officers. That said, it was clear that any action that was taken would be carried out in accordance with international law.
Asked if the US Administration supported the Prime Minister’s strategy to spell out in precise terms what Iraq needed to, the PMOS said that the proposal to outline the key areas where Saddam had to comply was one which had been floated by other Security Council members. We would not know what other countries thought of the idea until the UN met later today. Rather than engage in speculation, it was therefore right and proper to allow events at the UN to take their own course. Asked whether the 17 March deadline was an absolute deadline, the PMOS said that March 17 was the only date set down in the draft Resolution. If other colleagues on the Security Council had any other ideas, obviously we, and other members, would want to listen to them. We remained firmly of the view that we needed to maintain a very tight deadline because it was as a result of that, plus the presence of 200,000 troops, that we believed Saddam would comply and avoid conflict. Asked if the second Resolution would be ready in time to put to the vote at the UN by the deadline next Monday, the PMOS said that this was a matter which would be discussed at the UN today. As he had indicated over the weekend, he thought it might be later this week, rather than earlier, although ultimately it was for the Security Council to decide. Asked if the Prime Minister was intending to follow the lead of other world leaders and go to the UN so as to be there for the vote, the PMOS said he was not aware of any plans to do so.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister’s proposal to spell out what Iraq needed to do counteracted the suggestion that the UK was being ‘dragged along’ by the US’s plans and was not using its influence to modify them, the PMOS said that it was important to focus on what had actually happened rather than invent theories about what had not. Last summer, it had been predicted that the US would act unilaterally and ignore the UN process. In fact, the US had gone down the UN route with the result that Resolution 1441 had been passed unanimously. We had also seen the Security Council send in the weapons inspectors and we had seen the inspectors’ reports. At each and every stage we had gone down the UN route. We wanted to continue to do so, which was why the Prime Minister was currently engaged in the latest round of telephone conversations with world leaders.
Asked if the Prime Minister would guarantee a vote in the House before the start of any military action and whether Downing Street was drawing up plans for an emergency recall of Parliament, the PMOS said that it was important for journalists to resist the urge to get too ahead of themselves at this point. He would advise them to take things one day at a time. We did not yet know when the vote on the second Resolution would take place. Once we did, it would shape events in the days to come.
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