Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq.
Iraq
Asked to confirm reports that a three-way summit, involving the UK, US and Spain, was due to take place over the weekend, the PMOS said that the situation was still very fluid and dynamic. The weekend would be a time for continuing intensive diplomatic activity. If the Prime Minister had to travel, then obviously he would do so and we would obviously ensure that journalists would be notified in good time. However, nothing had been finalised at this point. Asked the point of a three-way summit between leaders who agreed with each other and what a face-to-face meeting could achieve that couldn’t be sorted out on the phone, the PMOS pointed out that we hadn’t confirmed such a meeting would be taking place and cautioned journalists against getting too far ahead of themselves.
Questioned as to whether a Prime Ministerial visit abroad, possibly to the US, would mark the end of the diplomatic process and indicate a need to talk about other scenarios with the US and Spain, the PMOS again cautioned journalists against jumping to conclusions about where the Prime Minister might be going were he to travel. Intensive diplomacy was continuing and we were continuing to work flat out at the UN and focussing all our efforts on trying to find the necessary consensus and common ground we were seeking. The Prime Minister was still engaged in phonecalls with other international leaders. We acknowledged that we were facing significant difficulties. That should come as no surprise given the comments earlier in the week from one of the members of the P5 saying they would veto whatever the circumstances. However, it was clear there was interest in, and a lot of detailed discussion around, our proposals we had put forward. We were expecting the discussions at the UN to continue during the course of the day and he would predict it would go into the weekend.
Asked if we detected any significant change in the stance adopted by the French in the light of the conversations that were taking place, the PMOS said that the difficulties remained and we were being realistic about them. Nevertheless, we were continuing to push ahead with our efforts to try to secure a second Resolution. We remained hopeful that we would be able to achieve that objective because we believed in the logic of Resolution 1441 which, it should be remembered, the Security Council had signed up to unanimously.
Asked if the Prime Minister was meeting Clare Short today, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister met Ministerial colleagues all the time. Given this was a critical moment, it went without saying that he would be seeing a number of different people. Ms Short was an important member of the Government when it came to humanitarian issues. Obviously we were all working flat out to try to find a peaceful resolution to the situation. Ultimately, it remained a choice for Saddam Hussein to make. However, it would be misguided, and frankly irresponsible, were we not to look at some of the issues which might have to be addressed in any post-conflict scenario. Asked if the Prime Minister would be meeting the Leader of the House of Commons, the PMOS said that he had no intention of briefing on the individual meetings the Prime Minister was having.
Asked about the PQ put down by Bill Cash regarding the legal advice given to the Prime Minister about military action in Iraq, the PMOS referred journalists to the Prime Minister’s comments on this issue in PMQs on Wednesday. His words spoke for themselves. It went without saying that the Prime Minister would ask for advice from the Government Law Officers before making any pronouncements about legal issues. Pressed as to whether the Attorney General’s legal advice would be published, the PMOS pointed out that there was a convention for any legal advice that was given to remain confidential. This enabled the Government to obtain full and frank legal advice in confidence.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister had spoken to President Bush and Prime Minister Aznar in the last twenty-four hours, the PMOS said that we were not giving a running commentary of the calls the Prime Minister was making, not least because it would take up a large chunk of the twice-daily press briefings. That said, the White House had confirmed yesterday that the Prime Minister had spoken to the President, so that was clearly no secret. The PMOS took the opportunity to say that while it was perfectly legitimate for the media to focus on the diplomatic process and ask questions about progress being made at the UN, it was equally important not to lose sight of the central issue at stake. We were one week on from the publication of Hans Blix’s ‘clusters’ document. Since then, had we seen any sign of the 550 mustard gas shells, the 6,500 chemical weapons bombs, the 80 tonnes of mustard gas still unaccounted for, the VX and the thousands of litres of anthrax and precursor chemicals? Evidently not. That was what this whole issue was about. Nobody, including President Chirac, believed that Saddam was co-operating as he ought to be.
Asked whether Monday would be the last conceivable date for the UN to vote on the second Resolution and whether the possibility of not having a vote at all was being actively considered, the PMOS said that a judgement would have to be reached at some point as to whether and when the diplomatic process should end. He was unable to say at this stage how that judgement would be made for the simple reason that people were still engaged in discussions at the UN and we were continuing to work flat out to achieve our objectives. That said, we were clearly coming towards the end of the process. We were certainly into extra time, although it was not the end of the game yet. Asked the point of voting on Monday March 17 on a second Resolution giving Saddam until March 17 to comply, the PMOS said that it was important for people to be patient and wait and see how things panned out. He was not suggesting that things were easy. Evidently they were not. However, we were continuing to work hard. There was clear interest in the proposals which we had put forward. It was still all to play for. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said that it was important to put the issue of time into context. He pointed out that as soon as one period of time expired, there always seemed to be a call for additional time to be given. Resolution 1441 had presented Saddam with a final opportunity to comply. It had not stated that he was being given a last-but-one chance. The Resolution had served notice on Saddam that now was the time he had to start co-operating and complying after twelve years of defying the international community in relation to his possession of WMD. But co-operation and compliance had to mean just that, as did serious consequences. For example, it had been reported yesterday that Iraq had announced it would present a report to the weapons inspectors on its anthrax stocks. There had been another report today suggesting that this had now been delayed. That was surely not compliance as most people would understand the term to mean. Put to him that the UK and US were the ‘masters of time’ and should be able to control the pace of the process, the PMOS said that a judgement had to be made at some point as to when the discussions at the UN should end. At the moment however, they were continuing because we desired a second Resolution. People were still working flat out, the Prime Minister was still working the phones and Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK’s Ambassador to the UN, was still engaging with all the other UN representatives. This was diplomacy at its most intensive. The reason why so much effort was being put into it was because the issues were so great.
Questioned as to whether we would be willing to modify the six tests, or even remove some of them, if requested to do so by France, Russia, China and Germany, the PMOS said that we were currently engaged in a discussion about the proposals. We had already indicated that we would be prepared to drop the requirement for Saddam to confirm his possession of WMD on TV if people thought it appropriate. The PMOS took the opportunity to point out for the record that this idea had been raised initially by UNMOVIC, not us. The reason for it was that such a declaration would give the people in Iraq more confidence to engage and co-operate fully without fear of retribution from the regime.
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