Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq.
Iraq
Asked if the Prime Minister had met Clare Short today to discuss her ‘non resignation’, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said he was not aware of any meeting between the two today. Asked whether the Prime Minister was aware of the statement Ms Short had issued this morning, the PMOS said yes. Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister was pleased that Ms Short had decided to remain in the Cabinet, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had always made it clear that he valued Ms Short as a Cabinet Minister who was committed to her Departmental responsibilities. Those skills were obviously very valuable given the current position. Asked if Ms Short retained the full confidence of the Prime Minister, the PMOS repeated that the Prime Minister had full confidence in her as a Cabinet Minister with particular Departmental responsibilities. As we entered a new phase of the process, we were already carefully considering all the issues regarding the handling of reconstruction in Iraq were military action to be launched. Asked if Ms Short was bound by collective Cabinet responsibility, the PMOS said that the principle of collective responsibility remained. Ms Short had expressed concerns over two issues in particular - the reconstruction of Iraq and the future of the Middle East peace process. Both concerns had now been met, particularly with regard to the latter given the commitment to publish the roadmap, possibly as early as today. It would depend on the announcement as to when the new Palestinian Prime Minister would take up office. Asked to explain how much agonising Ms Short could do while she remained a Cabinet Minister given her comment that she would continue to be critical of the stance on Iraq, the PMOS pointed out that it was possible to have genuine concerns and also be anxious that they were being addressed. As the three-way summit in the Azores on Sunday had shown, those concerns, which the Prime Minister shared, particularly with regard to the Middle East, were being met. He remained deeply committed to progress being made in the peace process, and also believed that Iraqi reconstruction post-Saddam should be headed up by the UN. In answer to further questions about the position of Ms Short, the PMOS referred journalists to a statement Ms Short was putting out this morning which would clarify matters.
Questioned as to whether any other Ministers had tendered their resignation today, the PMOS said he had no intention of getting into a discussion about other Ministers before they had made their own positions clear. Asked if he was implying that there were further resignations to come, the PMOS repeated that he was not going to get drawn into a discussion about other Ministers. Asked whether Downing Street would announce replacements for those who had resigned, the PMOS said no.
Asked if the Prime Mister had been surprised to learn this morning that the Deputy Prime Minister hadn’t heard of Lord Hunt, the PMOS said that as journalists were very well aware, Mr Prescott had been making a joke. As we had underlined on hearing about Lord Hunt’s resignation, the Prime Minister valued his contribution both as an NHS practitioner and his work as a Government Minister.
Asked to confirm Robin Cook’s statement that he had been making his views about Iraq clear in Cabinet ever since Resolution 1441 had been agreed last year, the PMOS said he had no intention of breaching Cabinet confidentiality. That said, it was important to recognise the difference between raising issues as concerns which had to be addressed - and which were being addressed by the Prime Minister and others - and talk of resignation.
Asked if Mr Cook had been telling the truth when he had said last night that Saddam Hussein did not have any WMD which could be aimed directly at a city target, the PMOS said that we disagreed with the description. The evidence set out in successive reports from Hans Blix pointed to the contrary. For example, Dr Blix had said in his first report that he believed that VX nerve agent had been weaponised. Moreover, what had happened to the scud missiles, which were clearly delivery systems? And what about the 10,000 litres of anthrax which had not been declared? No one could argue that these were not all weapons which were highly dangerous and which would cause many deaths. Asked which of the weapons he had listed could be aimed at a city target, the PMOS pointed out that the weaponisation of VX nerve agent meant that it had been made into a weapon. Scud missiles were also a delivery system. Ergo, both were highly dangerous.
Asked why the Prime Minister would be speaking to HM Queen later today and whether an Audience was a necessary requirement before sending troops to war, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister would be speaking to the Queen by phone this afternoon in the place of his regular Tuesday Audience at Buckingham Palace.
Asked the Prime Minister’s thoughts on President Bush’s televised address to the American people last night, the PMOS said that the President’s speech had been a measured analysis of the current situation. Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister supported every word the President had said, the PMOS said that the President expressed himself in his way and we expressed ourselves in our way. We were, however, in total agreement on the central point. Asked whether the UK would have any role in choosing the time for launching military action, the PMOS said that we remained in close contact with our American allies and discussions were continuing on a regular basis at all levels.
Asked if the Prime Minister would be flying to New York tomorrow, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any firm travelling plans at this stage. Asked to confirm reports that Mrs Blair had been phoning backbenchers to drum up support for the Prime Minister, the PMOS said that he was not aware of any such phonecalls - and neither would he be in any event.
Asked if the Prime Minister was satisfied that UN Resolutions covered the enforced exile of Saddam Hussein, the PMOS said the Prime Minister was satisfied that existing UN Resolutions authorised the use of force. It remained up to Saddam to decide whether to go in to exile voluntarily or face the consequences.
Asked if the Prime Minister would agree with Robin Cook’s point that either the Iraqi army was a big danger to its neighbours, in which case the idea of taking Iraq in a few days with minimum casualties was ridiculous, or it was not a danger to its neighbours in which case our declarations that it was an international threat were wrong, the PMOS said that the ultimate illogical argument was that Saddam was such a danger that he could not be confronted. The whole purpose of the UN’s approach over the past twelve years was that Saddam had to be disarmed quickly before he became a menace.
Asked to characterise the mood in Downing Street at the moment, the PMOS said there was a sense of regret we had not been able to forge the unanimous international consensus which we had been seeking. Equally, there was a sense of determination that the writ of the UN, as expressed in 1441, should be upheld, both for the sake of the future of the people of Iraq and also the future of the world community. Pressed as to whether the Prime Minister was upbeat or apprehensive about what was to come, the PMOS said that he was simply getting on with the job.
Asked the Prime Minister’s message to backbench MPs and the Commons, the PMOS said the Prime Minister’s central message was that for the past twelve years, Saddam had avoided doing what the international community had said he must do - i.e. disarm. Consequently, it was important to ensure that the UN’s original intention, as re-expressed as a final opportunity in 1441, was implemented. If we did not do so, the UN’s authority would suffer and Saddam would be left in place with his WMD to wreak the havoc that he was perfectly capable of inflicting. We could not allow him to do that.
Asked if the Prime Minister had ceased to blame the French for what had happened, the PMOS said the Prime Minister remained of the view that, unfortunately, those who had eased the pressure on Iraq had made the prospect of war more likely, not less. As we had pointed out on many occasions in the past, it was only through united pressure that Saddam would have finally received the message that he had to comply. Put to him that it could be argued that it was the UK and US who had broken up the UN process, the PMOS pointed out that Dr Blix himself had observed that Saddam was not complying with his international obligations, as had all the other members of the Security Council. The terms of 1441 could not have been clearer. Saddam had to comply immediately and fully. Self evidently he had not done so. The PMOS pointed out that Saddam’s elliptical declaration on 8 December 2002 could be considered a material breach of 1441 and that we could have drawn the conclusion at that point that he was not co-operating, meaning that the ’serious consequences’ should have followed at that time. Instead, we had been very patient - not only over the past twelve years but also during the past four and a half months. Put to him that our arguments had not persuaded those in the UN who disagreed with our position, the PMOS pointed out that other European countries supported our stance, despite the attempts of others to persuade them otherwise by various means. For example, today we had seen Australia and Denmark come on board. Other countries were also expressing their support. Clearly, the idea that we were isolated was simply wrong.
Questioned as to whether the Prime Minister had spoken to President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder in the run-up to the European Council in Brussels at the end of the week, the PMOS said that he hadn’t spoken to either leader within the last twenty four hours. Asked the Prime Minister’s reaction to Robin Cook’s view as stated in his resignation letter that the UK was isolated amongst Europe’s socialist parties and that there was now a damaging division between Britain and its ‘major allies’, namely France and Germany, the PMOS said that as a Civil Servant he was unable to comment on political issues. That said, on a more general point, the Prime Minister acknowledged that Europe was divided roughly in half. The UK was not isolated. Other member states supported our position, as did many accession countries. They did so because they recognised in 1441 that the UN was determined that Saddam should comply in full. In terms of the future of Europe, we obviously needed to address the reason as to why these divisions had surfaced. Maintaining a false unity, however, while looking the other way was not the right approach to address those questions.
Asked if the Prime Minister viewed tonight’s vote as an authorisation of military action, the PMOS said that the motion spoke for itself. Obviously we respected the demographic mandate of the House of Commons and would work to achieve a majority.
Asked whether the Prime Minister would allow MPs to vote against military action in Iraq on their consciences rather than expect them to vote along political lines, the PMOS said that he was not going to pre-judge the outcome of the vote this evening. That said, of course the Prime Minister believed that it was up to MPs to express their views individually. However, people had to understand that there was no more serious act for a Government than going to war. That was precisely why the Prime Minister was seeking the support of as many MPs as possible, including those from his own party. Asked if he could guarantee that military action would not be launched until after the vote tonight, the PMOS said that his colleague had answered this question yesterday. A vote would not take place against the backdrop of military action. Asked to state on-the-record that the Prime Minister expected his Ministers, including his Cabinet Ministers, to vote with the Government and that it would be a resigning matter if they did not, the PMOS repeated that he was not going to speculate about the outcome of the vote other than to say that it was a matter of Government policy.
Asked if we continued to believe that the Iraqi regime was showing signs of fracturing, the PMOS said that while he would acknowledge that this was a perfectly legitimate question to ask, he did not think it would be helpful to get drawn into a discussion about intelligence matters.
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