Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Iraq/WMD and Euro.
Iraq/WMD
In answer to questions, the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) said that the position regarding this matter remained entirely as set out by the Prime Minister many times in recent days. Everyone accepted that the issue of Iraq had aroused enormous passions - on both sides of the argument. From the outset, opponents of the conflict had made all sorts of predictions which their endless repetition had not made any the more true. For example, they had said that the Middle East would go up in flames, that the conflict would be endless, that we would never take Baghdad, that we would never achieve a post-conflict UN Resolution and so on. None of these had come to pass. Obviously the current situation in Iraq was by no means perfect. However, it was clear that the Iraqi people were now slowly able to leave behind their very dark past and look forward to a brighter future. In terms of the Middle East, the PMOS pointed out that President Bush was currently visiting the region and was due to attend a very important summit tomorrow. Of course no one was suggesting that this process would not be fraught with its own difficulties. Nevertheless, it was important not to under-estimate what was happening there. A lot of people had said that it would never happen. Now people were focussing their attention on the issue of WMD, which of course was perfectly legitimate. It was also perfectly proper that people were asking questions - particularly given the centrality of the issue to the whole Iraq debate. However, as the Prime Minister had said in his press conference at the G8 Summit in Evian yesterday in response to some of the more fevered allegations, if people had hard evidence to back them up they should present it. Equally, if people were scattering around serious accusations about the Government and its behaviour, it was important for our response to be heard. As the Prime Minister had said repeatedly, people needed to exercise a little patience. We would bring forward the evidence in due course.
Questioned about the possible role of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) in investigating the matter, the PMOS said that given the ISC’s remit, he would not be surprised if it didn’t already have this matter in hand. Our statements on the WMD issue had not changed. Our response to questions about the dossier, Saddam’s WMD and the process of investigation had been consistent from the word go. Asked if the Prime Minister would be happy to allow the ISC access to whatever material and personnel the Committee felt was necessary to conduct a proper inquiry, the PMOS said that any conversations of that sort would take place in the usual way. He repeated that, given the nature of the Committee and its remit, he would be surprised if they did not already have the matter in hand. As he understood it, however, the ISC, unlike other Committees, did not provide an ongoing commentary on the progress of its inquiries. Asked if the Prime Minister would be happy to give the evidence which was being disputed to the ISC for examination, the PMOS said that these were issues which could be discussed between the Government and the Committee. There were standard procedures regarding the way in which the two worked together which would obviously be followed. It was an important Committee which we took very seriously.
Asked the Prime Minister’s reaction to the calls for an inquiry, the PMOS said that we did not see the need for an independent inquiry of the nature being demanded. There were three points here: the dossier, WMD and the process. The dossier had been the work of the intelligence services. Suggestions that pressure had been put on them to doctor it were entirely false. Surely people were not suggesting that they would include something with which they were not happy. As the Prime Minister had underlined, the security services were the ones who had taken the judgement about what to include in the dossier. The evidence had not been invented by them or by politicians. Regarding the issue of WMD, as the Prime Minister had said on Sunday, there was no doubt that Saddam had had them and had been continuing to manufacture them. If that was not the case, what on earth had the last umpteen UN Resolutions been about? And why had Saddam not complied with his obligations? It was clear that Saddam had known what ’serious consequences’ had meant in Resolution 1441. If he didn’t have them, he had had ample opportunity to demonstrate the fact. One of the reasons why his WMD had been considered a particular threat was because of the possible link between them and international terrorism. In the Prime Minister’s view, it would only have been a matter of time before there would have been a ‘marriage’ between the two. Saddam’s regime had thought nothing of casual mass murder, as evidenced by the mass graves which had been discovered, and he was also willing to use WMD on his own people. The fact that such an unstable regime had access to WMD clearly exacerbated the threat to the rest of the world. In terms of the process, the PMOS said that it would have been utterly bizarre for us to have announced that our priority post-conflict was to look for WMD rather than focus our resources primarily on humanitarian and reconstruction issues. Quite rightly we would have been absolutely hammered for doing such a thing. Put to him that it was obviously important to find the WMD as quickly as possible to prevent them falling into the hands of terrorist groups, the PMOS said it was important to remember that Saddam and the Ba’ath Party were no longer in power. He pointed out that an international survey team was due to start work this week on the search for WMD. It might be the case that they would have to investigate hundreds, if not thousands, of different sites, which was precisely why people needed to exercise a little patience and cool down a bit.
Put to him that an inquiry, along the lines of the Franks inquiry after the Falklands war, might help to clear the air, the PMOS said that simply because anonymous people were making allegations about a dossier which were then endlessly repeated - and which had been denied and refuted many, many times in recent days - did not mean that their veracity were enhanced in any way. Put to him that such an inquiry would lay the allegations to rest once and for all, the PMOS repeated that we did not see the need for an independent inquiry, for all the reasons we had been through at length in recent days.
Asked if the Prime Minister continued to believe that Saddam had had WMD ready to be used at 45 minutes’ notice, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had addressed this question many times over the last few days. What had appeared in the dossier had been the work of the intelligence services and we continued to stand by it. Asked if the only political input into the dossier had been the foreword and conclusion, the PMOS said that these things went through a normal drafting process. The content of the dossier had been the work of the intelligence services. Pressed as to whether the intelligence services had written the dossier, the PMOS underlined again it had not been doctored by politicians or anyone else. If we were saying that the dossier was the product of intelligence and that the intelligence services stood by what was in it, that was not an unreasonable position to be in. Put to him that the suggestion that Saddam’s WMD could have been ready to use at 45 minutes’ notice should have been omitted, no matter how good it had sounded, because it had been based on one unreliable source, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister had dealt with this point many times in recent days. As he had said repeatedly, what had been included in the dossier had been the result of judgements taken by the intelligence services themselves. Asked if Downing Street had written the final draft of the dossier, the PMOS said that as the Prime Minister had underlined many times in recent days, the dossier had been the work of the intelligence services. Suggestions that any pressure had been put on them to change it were entirely false. Obviously there had been a drafting process which had been gone through, as you would expect. However, the material itself was the work of the intelligence services. Questioned as to who had done the drafting, the PMOS said he had no intention of getting into some sort of giant process story just because people were not satisfied with the answers we had given on the substantive issues about the nature of the report. Pressed further, the PMOS said that simply because our response did not fit the construct people wanted to put on this did not mean that they should pursue another ‘interesting’ non-story about some ’secret’ drafting process in Downing Street.
Asked if the Prime Minister believed that the information given to the Today Programme, which itself had appeared to base its story on a single unnamed source, had been incorrect, the PMOS said that as he understood it, following the broadcast of the report, Downing Street had given Today a statement which had stated that the report had been the work of the intelligence services and that suggestions that any pressure had been put on them to change it were entirely false. Clearly people should treat anonymous sources with caution.
Asked the genesis of the dossier based on the work of a PhD student and this one, the PMOS said that the two dossiers were separate in nature. People had asked us, quite rightly, to tell them more about the issue of WMD and the nature of the threat given the debate on the subject. We had accepted that it was not usual to publish material of this sort, but had decided that it was important to do so in the context of the debate that had been taking place. In contrast, the dossier, about which we had acknowledged that the sourcing had been ‘under-reported’, had focussed on historical aspects of Saddam’s regime and its nature. No one had disputed any of the contents.
Asked when the next dossier would be published, the PMOS said that the Prime Minister himself had said that the evidence would be brought forward in the coming weeks and months. Questioned about its contents, the PMOS said that he didn’t know what format it would take. Indeed, he wouldn’t even necessarily badge it as a ‘dossier’. The evidence would be presented, as the Prime Minister had made clear.
Asked who the Prime Minister believed was hiding the WMD given Saddam’s regime had gone, the PMOS said that there was a process which had to be gone through in terms of interviewing scientists and checking sites. The Prime Minister had said many times that he had absolutely no doubt the evidence would come to light. That view had not changed. Questioned further, the PMOS said he did not think it would be helpful to pre-judge a process which was still in its early stages. Asked if he would agree it was ‘terrifying’ that the WMD were still somewhere out there, the PMOS repeated that Saddam and the Ba’ath Party were no longer in control of Iraq and the Coalition forces were there on the ground.
Asked if the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications Strategy, Alastair Campbell, felt under any pressure, the PMOS said no. He suggested that attention had turned to Mr Campbell because journalists had come to a dead end with the angles they were pursuing and wanted to keep things going by lobbing in another personality to the story. Asked if Mr Campbell was a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the PMOS said no. Asked what input he would have had in the drafting of the WMD dossier, the PMOS said he had no intention of getting drawn into a discussion about who said it should be ‘the’ rather than ‘a’ or whatever. The document had been the work of the intelligence services. It had drawn on intelligence which had not been invented either by the security services, the Government or anyone else. That was what mattered. He couldn’t be clearer than that.
Euro
Asked for a reaction to reports that two out of the five economic tests had narrowly failed, the PMOS said that the Treasury’s assessment had now been circulated to all Cabinet Ministers. A further round of ministerial meetings with the Prime Minister and Chancellor would take place this week before Thursday’s special Cabinet on the Euro. The Chancellor would be making his Statement on Monday. Tempting as it was to engage in speculation, it would probably be more helpful for people again to exercise a little patience. There wasn’t long to go.
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