Briefing from the Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman on: Progressive Governance Summit, Iraq/WMD/Uranium and Guantanamo Bay.
Progressive Governance Summit
The Prime Minister’s Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Prime Minister was currently attending the Progressive Governance Summit in Bagshot today. He would be holding a press conference this afternoon, together with the other Heads of State and Government who were also attending the conference. This morning, he had had a bilateral with President Mbeki in which they had discussed Africa, including progress on the implementation of NEPAD, and Zimbabwe.
Asked to comment on reports that intervention in failing states was an issue on which the Prime Minister wanted a new doctrine published, the PMOS said that a communiqué would be issued at the end of the Summit. As ever, it would not be helpful to brief on its contents in advance. A press conference had been arranged in which the Prime Minister would no doubt take the opportunity to explain anything therein which might cause excitement. That said, he did not think that the communiqué would contain anything particularly incendiary.
Asked if today’s meeting was a Government event, the PMOS said yes. The Summit had started on Friday when it had been a political event. It had become a Government event yesterday evening. It was being attended by fourteen Heads of Government and State, following meetings in Stockholm, Berlin, Florence and New York.
Iraq/WMD/Uranium
Asked to verify the Foreign Secretary’s apparent confirmation this morning that the UK had passed on intelligence to the US about Iraq’s attempt to purchase uranium from Niger, the PMOS said he didn’t think that was the point which Mr Straw had been making this morning. We had always maintained that we stood by the intelligence relating to uranium contained in the September dossier - which, for the avoidance of any doubt, had underlined that Saddam had been ’seeking’ to acquire uranium, not that he had actually acquired it. The information had been based on intelligence from more than one source, none of which had come from the UK or US. It had drawn on evidence other than the forged documents about which we had had no knowledge until 2003. As we had stated repeatedly, since the intelligence was not UK intelligence, it was therefore not ours to share with other countries.
Put to him that this whole issue boiled down to a question of quality control inasmuch as we were unable to verify the validity of the intelligence passed to us because it was not our intelligence, in addition to the fact that we were even unable to pass it on, the PMOS said that as Condoleeza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld had made clear yesterday, the US had made the statements they had made in recent days because they had not had access to this particular intelligence. Consequently, their position was that bit different to ours. We were able to stand by the claims made in the September dossier for the simple reason that they were the judgements of the JIC who had assessed the intelligence. Asked to explain how the JIC had been able to assess the validity of the intelligence when it was not British or American, the PMOS said that he himself was not an expert on intelligence matters. That said, it was the case that the JIC comprised experts in this field, all of whom had a clear understanding of how other intelligence agencies operated and how much weight should be given to the particular strands of intelligence they received. These were judgements they were clearly qualified to make, which was why they, rather than politicians, made them. That was the long and short of it.
Asked if the UK would check back with the original intelligence source to find out whether the information they had passed on to us could, in fact, have been passed on to the US, the PMOS said that this was the sort of thing that would be discussed by the intelligence community. There was, however, no automacity. We couldn’t simply pass on intelligence from one ally to another.
Questioned as to whether intelligence had come from France and Italy, the PMOS said that he did not know - and nor should he. Asked if he recognised today’s Telegraph story suggesting that the source was the French Government who had not wanted their intelligence passed on to the US because they did not want to help reinforce the US’s case for war, the PMOS repeated that he did not know the source of the intelligence. Asked if he would be in a position to find out who the source was, the PMOS said no. We were hardly likely to brief the press in these circumstances on its provenance. The ISC could obviously look at these sorts of issues during the course of their inquiry.
Asked if the UK had known about the visit of an Iraqi delegation to Niger in 1999 prior to the news that the US envoy, Joseph Wilson had visited, the PMOS pointed out that Mr Wilson himself had reported that an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger in 1999, which, it could be argued, was supportive of our judgement that Iraq had been seeking to acquire uranium. Moreover, as Jack Straw had pointed out this morning, there was further evidence in terms of Iraq’s intention to restart their nuclear programme by recalling technical specialists and the procurement of dual-use equipment for example. We also knew that Iraq had procured some 200 tonnes of uranium from Niger in 1981-2. In answer to further questions, the PMOS said he understood why he was being asked these questions. Until the Iraq Survey Group published its report and we were able to bring forward the evidence, there was clearly a vacuum which allowed people to conduct these discussions and report assertions as fact, even though they were obviously not in possession of a huge amount of actual knowledge. However, it was important not to overlook the developments of yesterday relating to the Iraqi Governing Council which were clearly significant. Pressed as whether we had known about the visit of the Iraqi delegation in 1999 prior to the news emerging about Mr Wilson’s visit, the PMOS said that we had only recently become aware of the US envoy’s visit. Put to him that he hadn’t answered the question, the PMOS said he just had, but he also had absolutely no intention of getting into a discussion about what form of intelligence our assessment was based upon - firstly because he did not know - and nor should he. Secondly, we were confident about the assessment made by the JIC because they were experts in this field and it was up to them to analyse the intelligence that was received and reach their judgements. The ISC would be able to look at these issues as well. The PMOS acknowledged that the dossier had touched on issues relating uranium. However, it was important not to lose sight of what it had said about chemical and biological weapons as well. As we had been saying repeatedly over the last few days, the issue of WMD was not something upon which we had suddenly alighted last September. Saddam had been in violation of numerous UN Resolutions on the subject of WMD stretching back almost fifteen years, most recently Resolution 1441 in November.
Questioned about Hans Blix’s comments over the weekend about the 45-minute claim, the PMOS said that if he was being asked about the story which the BBC had led on yesterday, it was worth noting that Dr Blix had said something broadly similar the previous week on BBC Radio 4’s The World This Weekend about the 45-minute claim. The reason why we had taken action against Iraq was because Saddam had not complied with his international obligations. It was as simple as that. UNMOVIC had been unable to carry out its job because Saddam had been engaged in a systematic programme of non-compliance. Asked what he thought the BBC was up to, the PMOS said he couldn’t possibly imagine. Dr Blix had had a difficult job to do. This was clearly made much harder by nature of the engagement he had had with the Iraqi Government at the time. Asked if the Prime Minister continued to believe that the 45-minute claim had been a credible declaration to make, the PMOS said that if he was being asked whether we stood by the intelligence contained in the September dossier in relation to the 45-minute claim, the answer was yes. Dr Blix was entitled to express his views, but we did not agree with him in this instance. Asked if he was suggesting that Dr Blix’s views carried no greater weight than those of Andrew Gilligan for example, the PMOS said that there was a fundamental difference between someone questioning the actual intelligence material and a claim that intelligence had been inserted contrary to the wishes of the intelligence services and with Downing Street knowing it to be wrong. No one was claiming that was true - not least the BBC.
Asked if our determination to stand by the 45-minute claim was because we believed it was true that Iraq had WMD which could be deployed within 45 minutes or whether it was because we were simply standing by the judgement of the JIC, the PMOS said that people had been asking us last year, quite reasonably, to put into the public domain the intelligence which had formed the basis of our concerns as to why Saddam posed such a threat. We had made it clear from the very beginning that the judgements in the dossier were those of the JIC. They were not political judgements, but the judgements of the intelligence community. Questioned as to whether they might be wrong, the PMOS said that we continued to stand by everything contained in the dossier. Nothing in it so far had been proven to be wrong. Time would tell and people should be patient.
Guantanamo Bay
Asked what the Prime Minister would say to President Bush about the British Guantanamo Bay detainees, the PMOS said that he had no intention of previewing the talks. However, we were in the process of discussing various options with the US - one of which was repatriation. Asked if repatriation was our preferred option, the PMOS said that we had expressed our concerns many times about military commissions. However, he did not think it would be helpful to get drawn into a discussion about preferred options and the like. A judgement had to be made as to how helpful it was to go public about this matter given the fact that there difficult legal issues to be discussed. Questioned further about repatriation, the PMOS said it was important to remember that the individuals concerned were where they were because they had been picked up and were facing allegations that they had fought for Al Qaida and the Taliban against Coalition forces. Obviously it was not for him to say whether these claims were accurate or not. Put to him that some of the detainees had been picked up at Gatwick, Gambia and Pakistan, not Afghanistan, the PMOS said he was simply making the point that they were allegedly linked to the war on terror post-September 11 and the action in Afghanistan.
Asked about contacts between the UK and US Governments and whether the Prime Minister saw his meeting with President Bush as a moment to ‘bring them to bear’, the PMOS pointed out that Jack Straw had been in contact with Colin Powell about this matter. The Prime Minister would be going to Washington on Thursday. We would wait and see how things panned out. People should exercise a little patience and not jump too far ahead.
Asked if there was a Cabinet Committee that was settling the position relating to the British detainees, the PMOS said no. If he was being asked about the Home Secretary’s role, it was important to understand that, contrary to some reports, Mr Blunkett had not blocked any proposals. There were legitimate issues which had to be addressed when repatriating people. For example, the fact that the CPS was an independent body obviously meant that we were unable to give guarantees in respect of people being charged, let alone prosecuted. He thought that was the genesis of the stories in the papers at moment. It went without saying that there was an ongoing discussion between Downing Street, the Foreign Office and the Home Office about this matter in the usual way.
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